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ABSTRACT 
 
 
SU DONG. Toward systematic design of knowledge-intensive service delivery 
networks (Under direction of DR. RAM KUMAR and DR. MONICA JOHAR) 
 
Effective management of IT-enabled services is becoming increasingly important. 
These services are often delivered by networks of knowledge workers who constitute 
Knowledge Intensive Service Delivery Networks (KISDN). This dissertation contributes 
to the effective design and management of KISDN by presenting two mixed integer 
programming models which integrate disparate streams of research. The first model 
facilitates analysis and managerial benchmarking of KISDN. We focus on how the 
performance of such networks depends on the interaction between workflow decisions, 
information flow networks (IFNs) structure and knowledge management decisions. We 
propose that knowledge about IFNs and worker competencies can be effectively used to 
make workflow decisions. Our results, based on the study of different IFN archetypes, 
illustrate practices for effective management of KISDN. Recognizing existing IFNs, 
increasing randomness in IFNs, nurturing weak or performative ties depending on the 
archetype, assigning tasks based on effective worker competence, and selectively 
delaying assignment of tasks to workers can enhance business value. The second model 
focuses on the design of IFNs. Organizations are increasingly creating and using IFNs to 
transfer knowledge. However, there is limited understanding of the design of IFNs to 
maximize knowledge sharing. Our results demonstrate the impact of worker competency 
heterogeneity, number of skills supported by the firm, and time (cost) associated with 
knowledge sharing on the design of efficient IFNs. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Organizations increasingly use knowledge-intensive IT services delivered from 
multiple locations. For example, US Internetworking (www.USi.com) claims that over 
70% of its employees have at least one certification (such as a CISCO networking) and 
of these, 90% have multiple certifications and are located in the US and India. These 
employees may interact with each other, and constitute knowledge intensive service 
delivery networks (KISDN). Management of such KISDN is an important, yet under-
researched area. 
This research recognizes the complex nature of the KISDN by integrating 
concepts from prior research on task assignment (Sahni and Gonzalez, 1976), modeling 
knowledge exchange in organizations (Levine and Prietula, 2006), knowledge diffusion 
in networks (Cowan and Jonard, 2004), assessing the value of knowledge creation 
(Chen and Edgington, 2005), and mining and using organizational social relationships 
(Guy et al., 2008). A review of the previous literature sheds light on the factors 
impacting the performance of the KISDN. However, the KISDN, as a complex system, 
has not received adequate attention. The dynamics between the factors affecting KISDN 
performance require further investigation. Hence, through a series of essay, this 
research systematically studies these factors to facilitate the design of the KISDN.  
The first essay presents an analytical model to manage the performance of a 
knowledge-intensive service organization whose performance depends on a 
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combination of task-assignment and knowledge management decisions. We illustrate 
how information flow networks can be effectively used to make task to worker 
assignments and underscore the importance of paying careful attention to the location of 
„experts‟ in different parts of an organizational network. Specifically, we focus on the 
following research question: how do task assignment, knowledge management 
strategies (knowledge acquisition from co-workers) and information flow networks 
impact the financial and operational performance of organizations under different 
service environments? We prove that the problem is NP-hard and propose a heuristic in 
order to analyze the impacts of the factors on firm performance. Additionally, we show 
that organizations could benefit from waiting to make assignments, and should 
dynamically assign service tasks in batches using an assignment heuristic. Ways in 
which firms can strategically manage the impacts of information flow network 
structures are also discussed. 
The second essay focus on the design of the information flow network of 
KISDN identified in essay one. A mathematical model is proposed to study important 
factors associated with the design of such networks. There is a growing interest in 
managing organizational social relationships to facilitate knowledge sharing (Abrams et 
al., 2003). IBM (2006) research center has promoted the use of Social Network 
Analysis (SNA), “a set of tools for mapping important knowledge relationships between 
people or departments”, in order to understand organizational social relationships which 
could facilitate or impede knowledge sharing. However, prior research mainly focuses 
on ad-hoc use of existing organizational social relationships to share knowledge. There 
is limited research that helps managers systematically understand the design and use of 
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the information flow networks in KISDN to facilitate knowledge sharing. Hence, we 
formally pose the following research question in the second essay: how should 
organizations design and use their information flow networks in order to maximize 
employees’ knowledge gain through sharing under different organizational 
environments? 
This dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 1 provides an overview of the 
literature on Knowledge Intensive Service Delivery Networks (KISDN). Since the study 
of KISDN involves various streams of research, we have defined the scope of the 
investigation in Chapter 1. Chapters 2 and 3 discuss the two essays. Chapter 2 starts 
with a brief review of relevant literature to motivate the research questions, which is 
followed by the discussion of the analytical model. After that, we propose a heuristic to 
solve the problem. Simulation experiment design and results are then discussed, 
followed by the model extension, discussion and contributions. Chapter 3 also starts 
with relevant literature, and presents an analytical model afterwards. Similarly, a 
solution heuristic is proposed, which is followed by experiment design and results. 
Chapter 4 summarizes the contributions of the two studies and offers a conclusion to the 
dissertation. 
1.2 Literature Review 
The following sections discuss the relevant literature on KISDN and information 
flow networks that facilitates knowledge sharing within KISDN. More comprehensive 
literature will be reviewed in subsequent chapters for each essay. 
1.2.1 Knowledge-Intensive Service Delivery Networks 
This KISDN research is related to the call for development of a “service 
science” discipline which integrates perspectives from multiple traditional disciplines 
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such as information science, management science, social sciences and MIS (Bardhan et 
al., 2008; Chesbrough and Spohrer, 2006; IfM and IBM, 2008). The significant role of 
services in today‟s economy is realized by many organizations. Services stand for jobs 
and growth. But the evolution of the knowledge-intensive service industries also results 
in a new level of management difficulty and coordination complexity. For example, the 
delivery of IT-based services has engaged multiple business units and different 
geographies, creating new challenges for organizations to evaluate, implement and 
manage (Bardhan et al., 2008). The lack of a strong conceptual foundation for such 
“service science” attracts attentions from scholars and managers alike (Chesbrough and 
Spohrer, 2006).  
Prior research has recognized the importance of knowledge management in 
service delivery (Chesbrough and Spohrer, 2006; Maula, 2007), and the need to 
conceptualize service delivery as a process with “a focus on dynamic resources such as 
knowledge and skills” (Lusch et al., 2008). Maula (2007) argues that emerging “service 
science” should focus on knowledge-intensive services, knowledge and information 
management, and the dynamic complexity of the system. She justifies that knowledge in 
knowledge-intensive services should include employees‟ expertise and experience, 
process or system of services, and competence and capability to innovate, learn and 
renew. Knowledge and information management should emphasize on “the acquisition, 
availability, creation and sharing of knowledge, competence and intellectual capital” 
(Maula, 2007). Such a conceptualization with a focus on knowledge and skills of the 
workers is lacking in the prior research on call centers (Gans et al., 2003) and IT 
services (Buco et al., 2003).  
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Our research studies KISDN that have knowledge-intensive service tasks with 
service level agreements (SLAs). SLA contracts for IT service delivery such as e-
business often specifies the delivery of service functions, service quality measurement 
criteria, and penalties of failing to deliver quality service on time (Buco et al., 2003; Sen 
et al., 2009). Penalties for SLA violations can be refund to customers specified relative 
to the service cost (Buco et al., 2003). Considerable variability in customer preferences 
and service impacts the effective pricing and resource allocation mechanisms which are 
needed to deliver services at the promised quality level. Hence, effectively managing 
SLAs creates new challenges to IT services delivery. For example, firms need to 
dynamically allocating limited resources to minimize financial penalties due to SLA 
violations. Sen et al. (2009) propose a mechanism for SLA formulation that features a 
dynamic priority based price-penalty scheme targeted to individual customers. They 
prove that their proposed scheme is more effective than a fixed-price approach. Buco et 
al. (2003) study the design rationale of an integrated set of business oriented service 
level management (SLM) technologies developed by IBM. They find that a dynamic 
priority pricing approach can yield socially superior results. In addition, they 
demonstrate that demand heterogeneity can be addressed effectively in SLAs through 
dynamic resource allocation mechanism such as a price-penalty scheme that they 
proposed. 
In KISDN, employees often have multiple skills which allow them to provide 
heterogeneous services supported by the organization. However, their competence level 
for these skills may vary significantly (Kim et al., 2008). This competence 
heterogeneity creates space for knowledge sharing among employees within 
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organizations. Prior research also demonstrates that employees get information and 
acquire knowledge primarily by consulting their colleagues or friends when performing 
tasks (Cross et al., 2001). In addition, organizations allow workers to take training 
sessions to acquire knowledge (Chen and Edgington, 2005). Both training and 
knowledge sharing can increase the productivity of existing workforce by improving the 
overall employees‟ competence level. Our research recognizes the dynamic nature of 
knowledge and skills of workers by allowing them to vary over time during service 
delivery. We focus on organizations that provide knowledge-intensive services with 
SLAs, support multiple skills, have varying levels of worker competence, and often 
require knowledge acquisition. Such organizations are increasingly important given the 
trend in IT towards delivering software as a service (Mackie, 2007). 
1.2.2 Information Flow Networks Facilitating Knowledge Sharing 
The ability to create and share knowledge effectively and efficiently could be 
the basis for retaining competitive advantage in this ever changing economy (Abrams et 
al., 2003; Center for Knowledge Governance, 2004; Goh 2002). In order to facilitate 
knowledge sharing, many firms have invested heavily on knowledge management 
projects that emphasize the use of technologies which seldom bring in the expected 
(Abrams et al., 2003). Interestingly, many projects focusing on the use of technology 
failed in the past (Carroll, 2008). On the other hand, organizations are finding that 
employees are much more likely to consult their peers and colleagues (using 
organizational social relationships) for information and knowledge rather than use 
electronic knowledge bases and other technologies that firms adopted (Cross et al., 
2001). In addition, the structure of such information flow networks could significantly 
impacts knowledge sharing in KISDN (Abrams et al., 2003).  
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Prior research suggests that there is significant value of facilitating knowledge 
sharing among employees. Zhang et al. (2005) identifies four types of benefits of 
employees sharing knowledge in knowledge-intensive organizations: (a) it can increase 
and enrich the intellectual capital of an organization; (b) it ensures organizational 
advantage, lessen organization's dependency on individuals, and reduce potential loss of 
job-hopping; (c) it allows individuals to get more concentrated knowledge from the 
organization, and therefore increase personal competitive ability; and (d) it reduces the 
cost of accumulating knowledge within the organization. It is important to note that 
organizations can effectively create social relationships by providing physical 
environment (face to face communication platform), adopting motivation mechanisms, 
and using team/project assignment (Ardichvili et al., 2003, Bartol and Srivastava, 2002, 
Zhang et al., 2005). However, employee having excessive social relationships may 
create issues for IFNs (IBM, 2006). Cross et al. (2001) find that too many social 
connections produce significant stress and information overload for employees, which 
decreases the efficiency of the groups that they belong to. Hansen (2002) argues that 
establishing direct connections in a knowledge network provides immediate access to 
related knowledge, but requires significant time and effort to create/maintain. 
Moreover, replying on employees with large number of social connections to transfer 
knowledge creates potential risks to an organization such that if these employees leave 
the organization, the information flow network that facilitates knowledge sharing could 
break down. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2: SYSTEMATIC DESIGN AND ANALYSIS OF KNOWLEDGE 
INTENSIVE SERVICE DELIEVERY NETWORKS 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
We study KISDN whose objective is to maximize financial performance over a 
finite planning horizon. We focus on the following research question: how do task 
assignment, knowledge management strategies (knowledge acquisition from co-
workers) and organizational networks impact the financial and operational 
performance of organizations under different service environments? In our opinion, this 
is an important, yet under-researched question. 
Assignment of different types of service tasks over time to a pool of agents is a 
complex problem. We formulate a Mixed Integer Programming (MIP) model, discuss 
its complexity, and present a heuristic that combines optimization and simulation in 
order to facilitate systematic analysis of the above research question. The proposed 
heuristic integrates ideas from prior research on task assignment, knowledge 
management, and social network analysis. Quality of the solutions produced by the 
heuristic compares favorably with optimal solutions. Our results provide several 
interesting insights into the dynamics of the service environment. 
First, this research contributes to the emerging stream of research on social 
networks in IS by proposing and illustrating the value of using social network 
information for service task assignment in knowledge sharing environments. Use of 
social networks to access the knowledge of co-workers addresses a call in prior research 
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(Lusch et al., 2008) to use dynamic resources such as knowledge and skills in service 
delivery. We demonstrate the significant additional value that can be generated by such 
sharing. Second, prior research on call centers (Gans et al., 2003) and IT support (Kim 
et al., 2008) typically assume that service requests are picked from a queue and assigned 
randomly to available workers. This research, on the other hand, illustrates that 
organizations could benefit from waiting to make assignments, and assign service tasks 
in batches using an assignment heuristic. The significance of the value of waiting, 
anchored in the theory of real options (Trigeorgis, 1996) is discussed. Third, we 
demonstrate the effect of network topology, network density and worker‟s willingness 
to help on performance of the organization through knowledge sharing. A network 
topology where experts are distributed throughout the organization as opposed to being 
concentrated or clustered consistently outperforms other network structures. We discuss 
ways to reduce this performance difference between network topologies by intentionally 
increasing network density and/or providing incentives to enhance worker‟s willingness 
to help. In addition, we also illustrate how an organization can strategically use worker 
training as a means to mitigate the effects of network structure. Fourth, computational 
results illustrate how worker specialization occurs in a multi-skill environment and how 
the degree of specialization is a function of the network topology and density. Research 
and managerial implications of these results are discussed. 
2.2 Literature Review 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the study of KISDN integrates different streams of 
research including task assignment (Sahni and Gonzalez, 1976), modeling knowledge 
exchange in organizations (Levine and Prietula, 2006), knowledge diffusion in networks 
(Cowan and Jonard, 2004), assessing the value of knowledge creation (Chen and 
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Edgington, 2005), and mining and using organizational social relationships (Guy et al., 
2008).  
The assignment of a group of tasks to a number of agents in a manner that only 
each agent is assigned one task and each task is assigned to one agent is a classic 
problem in operations research. Efficient solution procedures such as the Hungarian 
method are available for this problem (Ahuja et al., 1993). Several extensions of the 
basic assignment problem have been studied (Sahni and Gonzalez, 1976). The 
Generalized Assignment Problem (GAP) is one such extension which has been proven 
to be NP-hard (Sahni and Gonzalez, 1976). GAP assigns a number of agents to a 
number of tasks. Any agent can be assigned to perform any task, incurring some cost 
and profit that may vary depending on the agent-task assignment. In addition, each 
agent has a budget. The sum of the costs of task assigned to it cannot exceed this 
budget. The objective of the GAP is to maximize the total profits of the assignment 
while meeting all the budget constraints. In the KISDN optimization problem, studied in 
this dissertation, there is stochastic demand for tasks. These tasks are assigned to an 
agent or a limited number of agents at a time. Agents are prohibited from carrying out 
more than one task at a time (but could perform multiple tasks over time) and firms 
incur costs when they perform these tasks. Costs are also incurred when there is either a 
surplus demand for service (similar to wait time penalties) or surplus supply of workers 
(similar to cost of “workers sitting on the bench”). The firm‟s performance is optimized 
over a planning horizon. The GAP can be polynomially transformed to an arbitrary 
instance of the KISDN optimization problem, as discussed. 
This research integrates ideas from different streams of knowledge management 
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research that consider the effectiveness of help-seeking behavior. Levine and Prietula 
(2006) use agent-based simulation to study the impact of different types of ties (strong, 
weak and performative) between workers in the context of knowledge sharing behavior 
in social networks. Similar to our research, they study the scenario where employees 
have a set of skills which are used to perform relevant tasks. Knowledge could be 
obtained through self-learning or exchange with other employees. They illustrate that 
having some performative ties in an organization improved average task completion 
times. However, they do not optimize task assignment or consider different types of 
network topologies. This research is also related to Cowan and Jonard (2004) who use 
simulation to study the impact of different types of network topologies in the context of 
knowledge diffusion across organizations. They find that the average knowledge is 
maximal in Small World Networks when diffusion reaches the steady state. 
Nevertheless, their problem is different from the one studied in this research and did not 
include optimization of task assignment, or different types of connections (ties) between 
nodes in the network. This research optimizes task assignment to workers, who can 
improve competence by seeking help from co-workers using ties. It compares the 
impact of different network topologies, network densities and worker‟s willingness to 
help on knowledge sharing and service delivery. 
In our model extension, we also consider the value of organized knowledge 
transfer (training). Chen and Edgington (2005) use simulation to study the effect of 
different training strategies on organizational value. They conclude that allowing 
workers to decide on when to go for training does not maximize organizational returns. 
However, they do not consider knowledge sharing among co-workers or optimize the 
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task assignment. 
This dissertation is also related to emerging research on social networking. IS 
researchers are increasingly interested in social networking (Agarwal et al., 2008). 
Organizations are recognizing the value of understanding social networks and 
influencing the formation of networks (www.orgnet.com; Guy et al., 2008; Sahoo et al., 
2008). There is a growing body of research on mining social networks from different 
types of organizational data including email, wikis and blogs (Aron et al., 2004; Van 
Der Aalst et al., 2005), and using social networks in organizations (Kilduff and Tsai, 
2003). Leading IT service providers such as IBM are building tools to mine social 
networks from internal organizational data as well as external data and make these 
social networks available to other applications through Application Program Interfaces 
(APIs) (Guy et al.., 2008). Shen et al. (2003) study task assignment in workflow settings 
and use social network information to assign tasks to groups. However, they focus on 
using social network information to help manage group dynamics and mechanisms. 
They do not consider knowledge sharing among group members when assigning tasks, 
and did not study the impact of social network structures on assembling workgroups. 
The model presented in the following sections integrates ideas from these 
streams of research and proposes the use of organizational social network information 
in improving operational and financial performance of KISDN. 
2.3 Model Development 
This section develops a mathematical model of KISDN, which are knowledge-
intensive service systems with distributed resources. Such organizations can be found in 
a wide range of service sectors like management consultancy, design services, computer 
and IT-related services (Evanschitzky et al., 2007; Windrum and Tomlonson, 1999). 
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This model helps to develop a better understanding of how people, technology, 
organization, and shared information engage in dynamic value co-creation. Such an 
understanding facilitates managerial benchmarking of KISDN. Figure 1 describes the 
process of value co-creation in such a service system. The arrows in the figure illustrate 
the value co-creation process, starting from the bottom left. 
 
FIGURE 1: An organizational (Virtual Network) with ties between workers 
In such a system, service requests need not be limited to telephone requests and 
may be routed through other communication channels such as faxes or emails or filling 
out web forms (Levine and Kurzban, 2006). In cases where service requests are routed 
through multiple levels, our focus is on the higher, more knowledge-intensive, levels of 
support. The bottom left portion of Figure 1 illustrates that it is not necessary for service 
tasks to be handled immediately by knowledge workers, though there often is a cost of 
delay due to factors such as service level agreement penalties (Buco et al., 2003). These 
knowledge-intensive service tasks vary in terms of task difficulty, required skills and 
associated revenue. For example, service tasks related to management consultancy 
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concerning mergers and post-merger integration, require distinct skills such as law, 
finance and so on (Evanschitzky et al., 2007; Windrum and Tomlonson, 1999), and 
service tasks related to computer and IT often require skills such as database 
management and C/C++. 
As shown in Figure 1, in order to generate business value, these service tasks 
need to be effectively assigned to workers. The revenue resulting from task completion 
is based on the skills required, the market revenue for tasks requiring those skills, and 
how difficult the task is. Workers in KISDN vary in terms of competences in these 
skills and organizational networks that they belong to. The time a worker takes to 
complete a task (requiring particular skills) could vary due to differences in worker 
competences (Chen and Edgington, 2005; Davenport and Prusak, 1998). The 
complexity of these service-tasks often requires knowledge-workers to share their 
distinctive capabilities in order to provide unique services (Davenport and Prusak, 
1998). Therefore, it is possible that when workers are assigned to tasks, workers consult 
other co-workers to complete tasks efficiently (Levine and Prietula, 2006; Szulanski, 
1996). Such competence exchange is an important characteristic of service systems 
(Maglio and Spohrer, 2008) and is a function of worker properties and the types of ties 
between workers. This represents an important step in value co-creation. Figure 1 
illustrates that reporting relationships, membership in global teams and project 
experience facilitate ties. As described later, technology can play an important role in 
facilitating competence exchange.  
As shown in Figure 1, some workers in such organizations may remain idle (“sit 
on the bench”) during any point in time. Organizations may continue to pay out wages 
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to idle workers, thus negatively impacting business value co-creation.  
2.3.1 Model Formulation 
Mathematical modeling is a useful tool to understand key variables that describe 
a problem and their relationships. The model variables described in Table 1 represent 
the different elements of KISDN. In addition, mathematical modeling helps understand 
the relationships between different variables, and produces a solution that can serve as a 
benchmark. This approach is appropriate in the context of service systems such as 
KISDN, when the goal is a better understanding of different factors in the value co-
creation process. We model the problem of co-creating value in KISDN using mixed 
integer programming. This approach is appropriate in scenarios where some variables, 
such as assigning a worker to a task, are binary and others, such as worker competence, 
are continuous in value. 
We formulate a Mixed Integer Programming (MIP) model where service tasks 
requiring skilled workers are assigned to competent personnel, if available. The firm‟s 
objective is to maximize the firm‟s expected payoff over a planning horizon ( P ). We 
consider the planning horizon (time) to be divided into a set of discrete assignment 
periods t  },..,1{ T  where t represents the assignment period number. At the start of 
every assignment period t, the organization makes task to worker assignments based on 
the number of unassigned tasks in the system, and the availability and competence of 
workers. Note that the length or duration of an assignment period (  ) represents a 
context–specific unit of time (minutes, five minutes, fifteen minutes, etc) within which 
any newly arriving tasks are queued but no assignment decisions are made. The notation 
is outlined in Table 1. Since the skills required by different service requests (tasks) 
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could vary, we assume that there are total of S skills supported by the firm and a total of 
M task types in terms of their skill(s) requirement. Particularly, 1
m
sq  when task of 
type },...,1{ Mm  requires skill },..,1{ Ss , 0 otherwise. Note that 1
1


S
s
m
sq , for each 
m. In addition, in line with prior research on managing IT service tasks (Buco et al., 
2003; Sen et al., 2009), we assume that the arrival rate of tasks of type m  follows a 
Poisson distribution with mean m , and the tasks arriving in each time period are 
independent of each other. The organization has K workers, and during each assignment 
a worker may be assigned to a service task, or kept idle (kept on bench). As discussed 
earlier, the firm may continue paying out wages to workers even when they are sitting 
on the bench. In addition, for each un-assigned task, the firm incurs a wait-time penalty 
per unit time. Hence, the firm‟s objective consists of the following terms: net payoff 
(revenue – cost) from completing tasks, the cost of workers sitting idle and, the wait-
time penalty from un-assigned tasks. Next, we briefly discuss how each of these terms is 
calculated. Additionally, we also outline how the uncertainty associated with some of 
the problem parameters is handled. 
TABLE 1: Major model parameters and decision variables 
 
  
Symbol Definition Type 
Decision Variables 
kjtA  
= 1, if worker k is assigned to task j in period t ; = 0, otherwise, with 
},...,2,1{ Tt  Decision 
Variables 
iklstH _  
= 1, if worker l provides help in skill s to worker k using tie i in period t ; = 0, 
otherwise, with i = 0, 1, or 2, indicates a strong, weak, or a performative tie 
System Environment 
Ph  Planning Horizon 
Exogenous 
Variables 
  The length or duration of each period 
T  Total number of time periods, with  /PhT  
K  Total number of workers in the organization 
S  Total number of skills supported by the organization 
Pc  Coefficient of task wait-time penalty per period, with ]1,0[Pc  
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TABLE 1 (Continued) 
Task Related 
M
 
Total number of type of tasks 
Exogenous 
Variables 
MaxN  Maximum number of tasks that have arrived over Ph  
sB  Billing rate per period for skill s 
m
sQ  = 1, if task type m requires skill s ; = 0, otherwise, with },...,2,1{ Mm  
jtTa  = 1, if task j arrives in period t ; = 0, otherwise 
jsTr  = 1, if task j requires skill s ; = 0, otherwise 
tN  
Total number of tasks that have arrived up to and including period t , with 

 

t
u
N
j
jut
Max
TaN
1 1
  
jsBm  
Time for a benchmark worker to complete component in task j that requires skill 
s  
jR  Revenue from completing task j , with 


S
s
jsjssj TrBmBR
1
 
m  Arrival rate per period of task type m 
sTt  
The average time required to complete skill s component in tasks by a 
benchmark worker 
Worker Related 
kWw  Wage rate per period for worker k 
Exogenous 
Variables 
Bc  Bench-cost coefficient, with ]1,0[Bc  
sWr  Wage rate per period for skill s for a worker of competence = 1 
ikl _  
= 1, if there is a tie of type i exists between workers k and l ; = 0, otherwise, with 
i = 0, 1, or 2, indicates a strong, weak, or performative tie respectively 
kstWc  
Worker k‟s competence in skill s in period t , ]4,0(kstWc . 0kstWc  indicates 
an expert and 4
kst
Wc indicates a novice worker. For our purposes a value = 1 
indicates a benchmark worker. Workers could take any values in this range of 0 
to 4 
( 1ksWc  are exogenous variables, and },...,2{ TtWckst   are derived variables) 
Derived 
Variables 
kjtWt  = 1 if worker k completes task j by period t, = 0, otherwise 
kstEc  
Worker k‟s effective competence in skill s in period t after consultation, with 
]4,0(kstEc  
 
ktWb  = 1 if worker k is busy in period t, = 0, otherwise 
Knowledge Acquisition 
  Knowledge retention coefficient, with ]1,0[  
Exogenous 
Variables 
iHc  
Overhead coefficient associated with worker providing consultation over tie of 
type i, with i = 0, 1, or 2, indicates a strong, weak, or performative tie 
respectively 
ikWh _  
Worker k‟s willingness to help over tie of type i, with i = 0, 1, or 2, indicates a 
strong, weak, or performative tie respectively (
2_1_0_ kkk WhWhWh  ) 
iklstGa _  
Represents worker k‟s gain in skill s from worker l using tie i in period t, with i 
= 0, 1, or 2, indicates a strong, weak, or performative tie respectively Derived 
Variables 
kstGa  
Represents worker k‟s gain in skill s in period t, after consultation 
Network Related  
Rp  Rewiring probability Exogenous 
Variables Nd  Network density 
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2.3.1.1 Net Payoff from Completing Tasks 
The assignment of worker k to task j in period t depends on (a) task revenue 
(  ), and (b) costs associated with completing tasks. 
2.3.2.1.1 Task Revenue 
Rather than directly choosing the revenue for a task, we arrive at this expression 
by first developing the expression at the skill level. We assume that the revenue for a 
task is a function of the skills required to complete the task and time that a benchmark 
worker (of competence 1) in the organization would take to complete the task. Hence, if 
s  represents the billing rate per unit time for skill s, the revenue from task j is given 
by, 


S
s
jsjssjR
1
 . Here, js  is equal to one if task j requires skill s, zero otherwise 
and js  represents time required by a benchmark worker (of competence 1) to fulfill the 
requirement in skill s for task j. This billing scheme is consistent with an industry 
practice of charging a standardized rate for a task based on task complexity (USi 2009). 
2.3.1.1.2 Costs Associated with Completing Tasks  
The total cost associated with completing a task is a product of the time to 
complete the task and the worker‟s wage rate ( kh ). The total time worker k takes to 
complete a task consists of two components, (a) time required to complete the task 
based on worker k‟s competence, (b) overhead incurred by worker k as a result of 
providing help to co-workers. These components are discussed below. 
Time Required to Complete a Task  
Worker k‟s competence (expertise) in skill type s, in assignment period t is given 
by ]4,0(kstW , such that the time taken by worker k to complete task j is given by 
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

S
s
jskstjsW
1
 . Thus, small values of kstW  indicate an expert worker, while larger values 
indicate a novice. In assignment period t, a worker, once assigned to a task, can acquire 
additional knowledge by consulting co-workers. We model the extent of knowledge 
gained by worker k, as a result of consulting co-worker l, as depending on: (a) the 
difference in their competence levels at that point in time )( lstkst WW  , (b) worker l‟s 
willingness to help ( i
l ). A worker‟s willingness to help is a function of the worker and 
the type of tie (strong, weak or performative) shared by co-workers k and l. Prior 
organizational research (Baum and Berta, 1999; Hansen and Løvås, 2004; Levine and 
Kurzban, 2006) has reported that individuals in organizations prefer using strong ties 
first (because they are more willing to help), followed by weak ties and performative 
ties. We model this by assuming 210 lll   , where 0, 1, and 2 represent strong, weak 
and performative ties respectively. Therefore, 
 

K
l i
i
klst
i
klstkst GG
1
2
0
represents worker 
k‟s gain in skill s in period t after consultation. Here, illstkst
i
klst WWG )(   is the extent 
of help acquired by worker k from worker l (sharing a tie of type i), and 1iklst  
(decision variable) if worker l provides help using tie i to worker k (0 otherwise), in 
skill s in period t. Note that we allow worker k to gain help at most from one worker in 
period t in skill s (i.e.,  1
,1
2
0
 
 
K
kll i
i
klst ). Finally, worker k‟s effective competence in 
skill s in period t is given by kstkstkst GWC  . Therefore, the actual time a worker 
takes to complete a task, after knowledge acquisition, is given by, 

S
s
jskstjsC
1
.  
20 
 
We propose that organizations could push a help source by combining social 
network information with competence information. Tools such as IBM SOcial Network 
ARchitecture (SONAR) (Guy et al., 2008) provide social network information that can 
be combined with competence information from other available tools such as 
Microsoft‟s Skills Planning und (and) Development (SPUD) (Davenport and Prusak, 
1998), Knowledge Interchange Network (KIN) and Tacit Systems EKG (Cross et al., 
2001). 
It is important to note that a worker‟s competence in the current period kstW  is a 
function of knowledge acquired in prior periods. We assume that every time a worker 
completes a task there is an improvement in the workers competence (i.e., kstW  
decreases) due to consultation. This assumption is consistent with human capital theory 
(Becker 1962) and prior research on knowledge management (Chen and Edgington 
2005). 1ksW  represents the worker‟s initial competence level (at the beginning of the 
planning horizon). Here, 1kjtX  (decision variable) when worker k has been assigned 
to task j in assignment period t, 0 otherwise and 1kjtF  if task j is completed by period 
t (0 otherwise). Hence, the competence gained from tasks completed by assignment 
period t is 

 
1
1 1
1t
m
kjtksm
N
j
jskjm FGX
t
 . Here, we introduce a retention coefficient, ]1,0[ , 
to capture the reusable proportion of knowledge gained from consulting co-workers. For 
example, 1  implies that the worker retains only a fraction of the learning for tasks 
in future periods. Therefore, worker k‟s competence in period t is modeled as, 


 


1
1 1
1
1t
m
kjtksm
N
j
jskjmkskst FGXWW
t
 .  
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Overhead Associated with Providing Help 
While consultation may benefit the worker receiving help, it is possible that a 
competent worker may be burdened by having to help multiple workers in a given 
period. Therefore, the organization must take the cost of proving help into account 
when choosing a help source. We model this cost by increasing the time taken by 
worker k to complete his/her assigned task, when helping co-workers. Particularly, this 
additional time (overhead) in period t is modeled as,   
  

S
s
K
kll i
i
lkstkt
i Z
1 ,1
2
0
 . Here, i  
is the overhead coefficient associated with worker k providing help over a tie of type i, 
such that 0
i  when there is no overhead from providing help. Such an overhead is 
relevant only when worker k is busy ( 1ktZ ), and increasing in the total numbers of 
workers being helped )(
1
2
0


 

K
kl
l i
i
lkst . 
Finally, total task time for worker k is the sum of,  
(a) time required to complete task j based on worker k‟s competence, 


S
s
kstjsjskjt CX
1
 .  
(b) overhead incurred by worker k as a result of providing help to co-
workers,   
  

S
s
K
kll
kt
i
lkst
i
i Z
1 ,1
2
0
 .  
Therefore, the total cost of completing tasks over the planning horizon is given 
by,    
    

T
t
K
k
S
s
K
kll
kt
i
lkst
i
i
N
j
kstjsjskjtk ZCXh
t
1 1 1 ,1
2
01
)(  . 
In summary, our model incorporates four factors that have been recognized in 
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prior research (Cross et al., 2001) as being important for effective knowledge sharing. 
These factors are: (a) “knowing what another person knows” which we model as worker 
competence kstW , (b) “willingness to engage in problem solving” which we model as 
i
k , (c) “being able to gain access” which we model by incurring a cost of providing 
help when a worker is busy, and (d) “degree of safety in the relationship” which we 
model using different values for 
i
k , based on the type of tie. 
2.3.1.2 Cost Associated With Workers Sitting on Bench 
When a worker is not competent enough to perform any task or there are no 
tasks available for him to perform, the worker might just have to sit idle for that 
assignment period. However, the firm incurs a cost for workers sitting on the bench, 
since it may continue to pay out wages to these workers. In our model, ktZ  equal to zero 
indicates that the worker is available in period t, and is not busy with any task assigned 
to him in a previous period. Therefore, the cost associated with the workers that are kept 
idle in period t is given by, b
K
k
k
N
j
kjtkt hXZ
t
 
 

1 1
))1((  . Here ]1,0[b  is the proportion 
of the wage paid when a worker is kept idle. This allows organizations to distinguish 
between a worker‟s wage rate when assigned a task versus sitting on bench. It is often 
equal to one in practice. 
2.3.1.3 The Wait-Time Penalty from Unassigned Tasks 
As discussed earlier, many IT service requests are time critical and delays in 
responding to these requests can often result in significant penalties for the firm. To 
capture this we introduce a task level wait-time penalty per period ]1,0[a . Here, a
represents the reduction in the task revenue (billing rate) for every time period that the 
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task is kept waiting in the system. Hence, if tN  represents the total number of tasks that 
have arrived till period t, the total wait-time penalty incurred in period t is given by, 
 
  

tN
j
a
S
s
sjs
t
m
K
k
kjmX
1 11 1
))1((  .  
Thus, the KISDN optimization problem can be formulated as: 
Objective Function
1
 

  
   

   
   
















T
t
N
j
a
S
s
sjs
t
m
K
k
kjm
K
k
bk
N
j
kjtkt
K
k
S
s
K
kll
kt
i
lkst
i
i
N
j
kstjsjskjtk
N
j
jkjt
tt
tt
XhXZ
ZCXhRX
Max
1
1 11 11 1
1 1 ,1
2
011
))1(()1(
))((


 
Total Task Revenue – Total Costs Associated with Completing Tasks (including the 
overhead of providing help) – Total Bench Cost – Total Wait Time Penalty 
 
Assignment Constraints 
,},..,1{},,..,1{   1
1
TtKkZX kt
N
j
kjt
t


 
Worker k can be assigned in the current period iff worker k is not busy with any tasks.  
 
},,..,1{   )1()(
1 1 ,1
2
0 111 1 1
KkTZXZCX
T
t
T
t
K
kll i
S
s
kt
i
lkst
i
N
j
kjtkt
T
t
N
j
S
s
kstjsjskjt
tt
    
      
  
Total time spent by a worker on tasks and on the bench cannot exceed T. 
 
},..,1{   1
1 1
Max
K
k
T
t
kjt NjX 
 
  
},,..,1{},,..,1{   0
1
TtKkX
Max
t
N
Nj
kjt 

 
A task can only be assigned once and after it arrives in the system. 
 
0)/))((( )1(
1
1 1
1
,1 
2
0
 

 

  
     tkj
t
m
kjm
S
s
t
mq
K
kll i
i
lksq
i
sjsjksmkjt FTXCmtF   
                                                 
1
 The linearized version of the above constraints is provided in Appendix A. 
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)1(
1
1 1
1
,1 
2
0
/))(((2 

 

  
      tkj
t
m
kjm
S
s
t
mq
K
kll i
i
lksq
i
sjsjksmkjt FTXCmtF 
,},..,2{},,..,1{},,..,1{       0
1
1
TtNjKkFX Maxkjt
t
m
kjm 


 
kjtF = 1 if worker k completes task j by time period t, 0 otherwise. 
i
klst =1 if worker k gets help in skill s from worker l using tie i in time period t, 0 
otherwise. 
 
,},..,2{},,..,1{    )1(
1
0 1
1
1
TtKkXFZ
t
m
N
j
kjmkjtkt
t


 


 
ktZ = 0 if worker k is available in period t (i.e., not busy), 1 otherwise. 
Knowledge Acquisition Constraints: 
 1},2,1,0{},,,1{},,,1{,},,,1{,)(  ikl
i
llstkst
i
klst iTtSsklKlkWWG   
i
klstG  represents worker k‟s gain in skill s from worker l using tie i in time period t. 
 
 },..,1{},,..,1{,1},,..,1{                 1
,1
2
0
TtSsKk ikl
K
kll i
i
klst  
 
  
Worker k can get help from only one worker l using one type of tie in skill s in period t. 
 
},..,1{},,..,1{},,..,1{
,1
2
0
TtSsKkGG
K
kll i
i
klst
i
klstkst   
 
  
 },..,1{},,..,1{},,..,1{   TtSsKkGWC kstkstkst   
kstG  represents worker k‟s gain in skill s in time period t, after consultation. 
kstC  is worker k‟s effective competence of skill s in time period t after consultation. 
 
},..,2{},,..,1{},,..,1{
1
1 1
1
1
TtSsKkFGXWW
t
m
kjtksm
N
j
jskjmkskst
t
 

 

   
Updating worker k‟s current competence ( kstW ) based on knowledge acquired in prior 
periods 
                  ■ 
2.3.1.4 Handling Uncertainty in problem parameters 
Recall that the firm‟s objective is to study how task assignment, knowledge 
management strategies and organizational networks interact in order to impact its 
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financial and operational performance. In that context, using expectations to estimate 
the type of tasks ( js ), arrival of tasks ( s ), initial competence of the workforce ( 1ksW ), 
and knowledge acquisition parameters (  ,, ibusy
i
idle ) removes the notion of uncertainty. 
However, we believe this is a relevant aspect of the firm‟s knowledge management 
problem. Therefore, in order to handle uncertainty more appropriately, the firm can 
draw different vectors of values for each of these parameters i.e., the firm 
conceptualizes the value as a random draw from an appropriate distribution. The firm 
considers random draws from the estimated distributions of the unknown values, solves 
independent problems for each instance, and takes the expected value across multiple 
instances. Note that the MIP formulated in the previous section can be interpreted as 
the knowledge management problem faced by the firm for one such instance. Given that 
the estimated distribution is continuous in nature, it is impractical to estimate the 
outcomes for all possible situations. However, if the number of instances (draws) 
selected is large enough, they would provide a reasonable approximation. The firm can 
basically estimate the value of its knowledge management strategies based on all the 
instances and the probabilities of each of the instances. This helps lend greater 
generalization to the model results.  
2.3.2 Network Structures 
We consider three types of organizational network structures: Clustered 
Networks (CN), Random Networks (RN), and Small-world Networks (SN) (see Figure 
2). These three network configurations are generated by “rewiring” the same total 
number of connections (Watts and Strogatz, 1998). In CN, all interactions are spatially 
local and a worker is directly connected to the same small number of his nearest 
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neighbors, i.e., a large number of cliques with few or no connections between them. 
This implies that in CN there tends to be large overlap between strong and weak ties, 
i.e., a friend are also a friend of a friend. On the other hand, RN have few or no cliques 
between workers. Hence, unlike CN, in these networks there is very little overlap 
between strong and weak ties of a worker. Lastly, SN lie somewhere in between CN 
and RN by having some cliques with limited connections between cliques.  
   
(a) Clustered Networks (CN) (b) Random Networks (RN) (c) Small-World Networks (SN) 
FIGURE 2: Different organizational network structures 
2.4 Solution Procedure 
2.4.1 Problem Complexity 
The KISDN optimization problem discussed in the previous section can be 
solved. However, a practical issue is whether realistic problems can be solved in a 
reasonable amount of time. Hence, we next discuss the complexity of our problem. 
Theorem 1: The KISDN optimization problem over some planning horizon is NP-hard.  
The main idea behind the proof is that the generalized assignment problem 
(Sahni and Gonzalez, 1976) can be polynomially transformed to an arbitrary instance of 
the KISDN optimization problem over some planning horizon T. In this construction, an 
item and a bin in the generalized assignment problem correspond, respectively, to a task 
and a worker. Assigning tasks to a worker corresponds to the notion of packing items in 
a bin. Appropriate choices for the service environment, worker, task and knowledge 
acquisition parameters complete the construction of an instance of the KISDN 
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optimization problem. For any positive integer 'J , the decision question “does there 
exist a valid task-to-worker assignment such that the firm‟s profit over the planning 
horizon T is greater than or equal to 'J ?” posed on the constructed instance is 
equivalent to solving the decision version of the generalized assignment problem. 
Consider the decision problem QKOP corresponding to the KISDN optimization 
problem over some planning horizon. 
Decision Problem (QKOP): Given the number of workers K, and the number of tasks 
MaxN , set values 1 ksW , kh , for each worker k, values
i
kl  for each worker pair (k, l), 
values 
js , js , jR , jt  for each task j, and values T, S,  , a , b , 
i
k , 
i  and a 
specified number J, does there exist a task-to-worker assignment such that the firm’s 
profit over the planning horizon T is greater than or equal to J ? 
We now show that the decision version of generalized assignment problem can 
be polynomially transformed to QKOP. 
Generalized Assignment Problem (GAP): Given a finite set of bins },..,,{ 21 mbbbB   
with capacity ic  for each bin ib , and a finite set of items },..,,{ 21 nxxxS  , set weight
ijw  and profit ijp  for each pair of item jx  and bin ib , and a specified number 
'J , does 
there exist a feasible packing, such that the total profit '
1 1
Jxp
m
i
n
j
ijij 
 
? 
A constraint in the GAP is that each item can only be packed into any one of the 
bins, (A.1)   },..,1{   1
1
njx
m
i
ij 

. A bin, however, can take multiple items, but should 
not exceed its capacity ic , (A.2)   },..,1{   
1
micxw j
n
j
ijij 

. 
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Given the generalized assignment problem, we now map it to an arbitrary 
instance of QKOP as follows. Each worker and task correspond to a bin ib  and an item 
jx  respectively in the generalized assignment problem. We construct an arbitrary 
instance of QKOP by setting 11 j  and 1,0  tjt },,..,1{, MaxNj  such that 
tNN Maxt   . This implies that all tasks arrive in the system at period 1. Also, 0a , 
and 0b  so that, there will be no penalty of keeping tasks waiting or keeping workers 
idle. In addition, we set 0ik , and 0
i  such that there will be no knowledge 
sharing among workers. One task can only be assigned to one worker, but a worker can 
perform multiple tasks over the planning horizon T. Therefore, this arbitrary instance of 
QKOP is given as follows:  
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The capacity constraint (A.5) in the QKOP means that the sum of the time taken 
to complete the assigned tasks and the time that the worker may be kept idle, cannot 
exceed the length of the planning horizon T. This corresponds to constraint (A.2) in the 
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generalized assignment problem. Thus, it is easy to see that for 'JJ   the solution of 
this instance of QKOP provides a solution to the generalized assignment problem. 
Moreover, the generalized assignment problem is known to be NP-hard (Sahni and 
Gonzalez, 1976). Hence QKOP is NP hard. 
                  ■ 
2.4.2 Dynamic Assignment Heuristic (DAH) 
If the planning horizon (P) was equal to the length or duration of a single period 
(i.e., P  implying 1T ), then the maximization problem would be similar to an 
assignment problem with inclusion and exclusion constraints. However, when the 
planning horizon is divided into multiple periods ( 1T ), then this problem can be 
solved for each period successively. In other words, we first determine the optimal 
assignment and the optimal payoff in the first period. Next, we set up the problem for 
the second period. To achieve this we use the assignment information from the first 
period, and take into account of all the new tasks that have arrived and the workers that 
have become available between period one and two. In addition, we update the worker‟s 
competences based on the task assignment in the first period. The optimal assignment 
and payoff for the second period can be obtained by using this information. Similarly, 
the assignment for the second period then sets up the problem for the third period, and 
so on. This would essentially be a greedy algorithm (with no look-ahead), wherein the 
emphasis, is on maximizing the payoff for only that period. In contrast, the proposed 
DAH improves over the greedy approach in two ways, (a) allows for dynamic 
assignment using a One-Period Look Ahead (OPLA) policy and (b) using suitable 
approximations, incorporates the value of learning viz., how the worker‟s knowledge 
acquisition in the current period impacts performance in future tasks. 
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2.4.2.1 One-Period Look Ahead Policy (OPLA) 
DAH uses a One-Period Look Ahead (OPLA) policy to decide whether to make 
assignments now or to wait until the next period. For each period t, the OPLA policy 
compares the objective functions of the following two scenarios: (a) making 
assignments in periods t and t+1successively (i.e., objective function value = a ), (b) 
wait and make assignments only in period t+1 (objective function value = b ). In both 
scenarios, we approximate the task arrivals for period t+1. We assume that on average, 
for each task of type m, m  tasks with task times equal to 

S
s
s
m
sq
1
  arrive into the 
system between period t and t+1. In the first scenario, a  is the sum of objective 
function values in assignment period t and the successive period t+1. Note that in the 
second scenario, since no assignments are made in period t, the firm incurs additional 
costs in terms of wait-time penalty (for unassigned tasks) and bench cost (for idle 
workers). Thus, b  is the objective function value from assignments at period t+1 less 
the additional costs stated above. Of course, these additional costs could be offset by 
making improved assignments in period t+1 (since a larger pool of tasks and workers is 
available). Hence, if ba   , OPLA policy will choose to wait for one period. 
Otherwise, the assignments are made in period t. This approach (OPLA) is applied 
repeatedly at every assignment period t. Hence, it is possible for the heuristic to wait for 
more than one period before making an assignment. 
2.4.2.2 Estimating the Future Value of Learning 
The value of learning depends on (a) number of additional tasks of type m 
completed as a result of learning )(
21
kmjtkmjt   , and (b) the revenue from each of these 
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tasks 

S
s
ss
m
sq
1
 . Here 1kmjt  and
2
kmjt  are the expected number of tasks of type m 
performed by worker k using skill s, over the remainder of the session with and without 
learning, respectively. In order to approximate the values of 1
kmjt  and 
2
kmjt , we need to 
consider – (a) the amount of time remaining in the planning horizon after the task 
assigned in period t is completed ))((
1



S
q
kqtjqjq CtT  , (b) the likelihood of the 
worker getting assigned to a task of type m in the future, after completing task j in 
period t ( kmjt ), (c) the workers effective competence, in skill s, with and without 
learning, ) ( kstkst GW   and kstW , respectively, and (d) the arrival rate of tasks of type m 
( m ). 
Note that, ))((
1



S
s
kstjsjsm CtT   represents the expected number of tasks of 
type m that will arrive in the remainder of the planning horizon. We propose that, since 
workers compete for tasks, the proportion of these tasks that can get assigned to worker 
k will depend upon his competence in task type m relative to his co-workers. Thus, the 
likelihood of assigning a task of type m to worker k is given by 
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On the other hand, even if there was no competition from co-workers, the 
maximum number of tasks of type m that worker k can complete in the remainder of the 
planning horizon can be estimated as the ratio of the time remaining in the planning 
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horizon to the average time taken by worker k to complete a task of type m. 
Mathematically, this ratio is 
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case, we propose that the proportion of these tasks that can get assigned to worker k will 
depend upon his competence in task type m relative to his competence in other types of 
tasks. Thus, the likelihood of assigning a task of type m to worker k is 
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Therefore, we estimate
kmjt  based on which of the two scenarios mentioned 
above places a tighter constraint on the number of tasks of type m that can be assigned 
to worker k. That is, 
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2.4.2.3 MIP formulation for each Period t  
Similar to Section 2.3 (MIP), in each period t, the firm‟s objective consists of 
the following terms: net payoff from completing tasks, the cost of workers sitting idle, 
and the wait-time penalty from un-assigned tasks. In addition the DAH objective 
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consists of the approximation for the value of learning in the current period on future 
periods. As discussed earlier, this depends on the number of additional tasks of type m 
completed as a result of learning )( 21 kmjtkmjt   , and the revenue from each of these tasks 


S
s
ss
m
sq
1
 . Mathematically, this is given by, 
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Here, tn̂  is the set of un-assigned tasks and tk̂  is the set of available workers at the 
beginning of period t. Using the same notation as in Section 2.3 (Table 1), in period t , 
the firm‟s maximization problem using DAH, can be we written as, 
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The assignment constraints are similar to Section 2.3, where we ensure that each 
task can only be assigned to one worker. Also, a worker can be assigned to a task, or 
kept idle in period t. The extent of knowledge acquired from a co-worker ( kstG ) and 
hence the effective competence ( kstC ), can be calculated in a fashion similar to the one 
described in Section 2.3.1.  
2.4.2.4 Implementation of the Hungarian Method 
To solve the maximization problem, in order to estimate the values for a  and 
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b , we use the Hungarian method (Cormen et al., 2001). The Hungarian method 
models the assignment problem as a p-by-q profit matrix, where each element jka ,  
represents the profit of assigning the k-th worker to the j-th task. Recall that in our 
assignment problem, there is a payoff associated with assigning worker k to task j, or to 
the bench. In addition, we also model a waiting-time penalty for each unassigned task in 
the system. Even so, we show that our assignment problem can be solved using the 
Hungarian method by generating an adjusted profit matrix. 
In the adjusted profit matrix, the payoff associated with assigning  
each task tnj ˆ  to each worker tkk
ˆ  (which is jka , ) is sum of the payoff 
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) associated with task j (Block A in Figure 3). Note that, as in 
the MIP, we only allow one worker to provide help to worker k in skill s in period t.  
Therefore, for each task j, worker l provides help to worker k )1( iklst , iff 
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The payoff associated with keeping a worker k on bench is period t is given as, 
bkh  (Block B in Figure 3). The number of rows in our adjusted profit matrix is 
determined by the number of available workers at the beginning of period t ( tk̂ ) , i.e., 
p = tk̂ . And, the number of columns is the sum of the number of available tasks in 
period t (
tn̂ ), and an additional option of keeping the worker idle (i.e., 1ˆ  tnq  ).  
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FIGURE 3: Profit matrix for the Hungarian method used in DAH 
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the profit matrix. The task payoff and the wait-time penalty in period t is given by 
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This could be written as follows: 
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the adjusted task profit.  
Updating the Overhead Associated with Providing Help 
One subtle aspect of DAH is that the cost of providing help is estimated only for 
busy workers )ˆ( tkk  , prior to making assignments. However, it is possible that post-
assignment (using the Hungarian method) some of the previously idle workers may also 
become busy. In that case, we need to check, for every such worker l, whether the cost 
of providing help incurred by l is offset by the benefit to every worker k being helped, 
and update the competence levels accordingly.  
Therefore, after making assignments using Hungarian method, we check 
whether 0)(
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worker k. However, as discussed in Section 2.3.1.1, worker l incurs overhead ( l
ih ) 
from providing help to worker k.  
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Finally, Figure 4 summarizes the DAH.  
 
FIGURE 4: Dynamic Assignment Heuristic (DAH)  
2.5 Simulation Design 
The complexity of the problem precludes analytical solution and requires us to 
use simulation. Other studies in IS have used simulation with synthetic data in order to 
provide stylized insights into relationships between key variables when the underlying 
phenomenon is complex and real world data is difficult to obtain. Such studies include 
the value of knowledge management (Chen and Edgington, 2005), electronic markets 
(Jones et al., 2006), the performance of IS teams (Rao et al., 1995), and security 
portfolios (Kumar et al., 2008). The value of our model is primarily to provide 
generalized insights into the operation of KISDN. This section describes the design of 
simulation experiments including, key parameters and their estimation. Fifty 
replications of each sample path were used, and average values of system performance 
measures were calculated. Such an approach using average performance analysis is 
consistent with prior MIS research (Chen and Edgington, 2005; Jones et al., 2006; 
Kumar et al., 2008; Rao et al., 1995; Sen et al., 2009). Simulations were extremely  
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computation-intensive. Hence, they were run on a cluster of 160 Intel Xeon CPUs on 
Dell blade servers with Red Hat Enterprise Linux operating system. The average time 
for running each replication of a sample path was 2.4 hours.  
Table 2 describes the numerical values, and justification for parameters used in 
our simulation experiments. Where possible, we have attempted to base these values on 
ranges that could be encountered in practice and/or prior research. These parameters can 
be divided into five categories: service environment, workers, tasks, knowledge 
acquisition, and network. Each of these is described below. In our opinion, service 
environment, worker, and task parameters can be estimated relatively easily. 
Knowledge acquisition parameters included in our model could be estimated 
approximately and help sensitize the organization to KISDN management issues that 
involve these parameters.  
2.5.1 Service Environment Parameters 
The service environment was simulated for a planning horizon P of 1200 time 
periods. As discussed earlier, it is important to realize that the actual value of each time 
period could be context sensitive. We assume 100 workers ( K ) and 4 skills ( S ) for our 
simulations. This represents a relatively small service organization. Larger values would 
significantly enhance computational complexity. Prior research on knowledge transfer 
(Cowan and Jonard, 2004) and technical support (Prabhakar et al., 2005) has used 5 and 
3 skills respectively. As outlined before, we use wait time penalties to model the impact 
of customer waiting and use different values of penalty coefficients ( a ) in our 
simulation experiments. As mentioned in Table 2, the choice of values is comparable to 
actual service level agreements (SLAs) (Buco et al., 2003, Sen et al., 2009). 
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2.5.2 Worker Parameters 
We use two worker related parameters: hourly wage rate for a benchmark 
worker (of competence 1) for skill s ( sh ), and initial competence of worker k in skill s (
1ksW ). The hourly rate for worker k ( kh ) is calculated from these as shown in Table 2. 
These values were chosen to be comparable to the range of values encountered in 
practice (www.payscale.com and Sen et al., 2009). In addition, we assume the bench 
cost coefficient ( b ) is one. Consistent with prior research on worker cross training 
(Sayın and Karabatı, 2007) a normal distribution of worker competence was assumed. 
Empirical research on the operation of IT service environments has illustrated the 
presence of considerable worker heterogeneity in service task completion (Kim et al., 
2008). We chose a range of four for worker competence, based on the Microsoft SPUD 
project (Davenport and Prusak, 1998) which recognizes four levels of worker 
competence in each skill. A mean of 1.4 was chosen to allow for a normal distribution 
of worker competence in the range 0-4. While it is easy to measure worker‟s wage rate (
kh ), it is more difficult to measure worker‟s competence ( kstW ). However, there is a 
growing trend of using technology to assess workers, competence and store them in a 
skill database. Tools such as Microsoft‟s SPUD (Davenport and Prusak, 1998) and KIN 
and Tacit Systems EKG (Cross et al., 2001) have been adopted by service organizations 
in order to measure and store worker competence for use in decision making. 
2.5.3 Task Related Parameters 
We assumed that the time taken by a benchmark worker to complete the 
requirement in skill s for task j, is given by ),( ssjs N   with values (in minutes) for 
each type of skill given in Table 2. We assume six types of tasks in terms of their skill 
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requirement, each task requires two skills, and an equal arrival rate ( m ) for each task 
type m. Task arrival rates and task times are in the range that could be encountered in 
practice
2
 (HP, 2007; Sen et al., 2009). Sen et al., (2009) reports mean and maximum 
values for task times in the range of 30 minutes to 8 hours, and HP (2007) reports 
problem resolution times of 4 hours to 10 days. In our simulation, for example, a task 
requiring skills 1 and 2 would have a mean task time of 15x10 =150 minutes, and a 
maximum time of 330 minutes. The billing rate for each skill ( s ) is calculated based 
on the hourly rate for workers, assuming a profit margin of 50%, which is comparable 
to prior research (Sen et al., 2009). Setting a standardized billing rate ( s ) for a task 
based on the skill required is consistent with industry practice (USi, 2008). 
2.5.4 Knowledge Acquisition Parameters 
The willingness to help ( i
k ), the overhead coefficient )(
i  and the knowledge 
retention coefficient ( ), are parameters designed to capture the characteristics of the 
knowledge acquisition environment. Willingness to help has been extensively 
researched (Cabrera and Cabrera, 2002). This parameter is a function of the type of tie 
(Baum and Berta, 1999; Hansen and Løvås, 2004; Levine and Kurzban, 2006). Cowan 
and Jonard, (2004) uses values in the range 0.5-1 for strong ties and recognizes that 
high values close to 1 are unrealistic. The values chosen by us are in this range. Cabrera 
and Cabrera (2002) provide an extensive discussion of techniques to enhance 
willingness to help. The overhead coefficient captures an individual's cost of providing 
help and depends on the type of tie (Marsden and Campbell, 1984). In our simulations 
                                                 
2
 A mean processing time per incident of 360 minutes was reported in discussions with a senior corporate 
systems support manager of a leading systems software vendor in 2009-2010. 
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we assume that the time spent on each help transaction is small, relative to task times
3
. 
For each help transaction, the values for the overhead coefficient chosen in Table 2 
translate to a maximum of 2.5%, 7.2%, and 12% for strong, weak and performative ties, 
respectively, for an average task time of 25 periods. It should be noted that when a 
worker helps multiple co-workers, the overhead incurred would be significantly large. 
Exact parameter estimation could be difficult. However, the intent is not to be able to 
estimate these parameters accurately, but to force organizations to think about whether 
these parameters are low or high and to consider ways to enhance their value. Such an 
approach is consistent with prior simulation based knowledge management research 
(Chen and Edgington, 2005). Knowledge retention coefficient forces organizations to 
think about synergies between tasks performed and is similar to the concept of reuse 
which has been used in other contexts such as software engineering (Schilling et al., 
2003). Learning while completing tasks has greater value in scenarios where the 
knowledge retention ratio is high. We experiment with a range of values for these 
parameters. 
2.5.5 Network Parameters 
A clustered network with 100 nodes (workers) was created by connecting each 
node with   of its nearest neighbors. SN and RN were created by disconnecting the 
link and reconnecting it with probabilities of 0.09 and 1 respectively using the Watts 
and Strogatz algorithm (Watts and Strogatz, 1998). It is important to note that the Watts 
and Strogatz algorithm maintains the same average number of neighbors even though 
                                                 
3
 This is consistent with practice, based on discussions with a senior support manager of a leading 
systems software vendor, and observations at a service organization specializing in the financial services 
industry. 
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the network topology changes. The values of   used are described in Table 2. We 
generate 50 different samples (with different connectivity) for each type of network. We 
simulate the performance of each of these 50 networks, and report the average 
performance.  
Organizations have been increasingly adopting tools to capture information flow 
networks. Commercial software such as InFlow (www.netorg.com) and IBM SONAR 
(Guy et al., 2008) allow organizations to extract organizational network information 
from emails, blogs, and other sources. 
2.6. Simulation Results 
This section presents important results from our experiments. These results 
illustrate the stylized behavior of KISDN in terms of measures of operational 
performance (Average total task time), financial performance (Objective function 
value), knowledge diffusion (Number and type of ties used per worker, average 
competence level of the workers in the organization, worker specialization), and 
assignment dynamics
4
. The impact of some of our parameters such as willingness to 
help is well researched (Cabrera and Cabrera, 2002). We merely note that increased 
willingness to help improves financial and operational performance and helps 
knowledge diffusion of KISDN, as expected. Our focus is on the impact of network 
structure (network topology and network density) on KISDN performance, since this is 
a relatively under-researched area. 
2.6.1 Impact of Network Structure  
                                                 
4
 T = 1200; K = 100; M = 6; S = 4; s = 6, 9, 12, 15; m = 1; a = 0.1, b =1;  = 10%; sh = 4, 6, 8, 10, s
{1,2,3,4};  =0.2; 0k = N(0.45, 0.03), 
1
k = N(0.25, 0.02), 
2
k = N(0.05, 0.01); 
0 = 0.1, 1 = 0.3, 
2 = 0.5 
Differences between network structures were tested for statistical significance using multiple paired t-tests, p<0.05 
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In order to compare the three networks structures (RN, CN and SN) we observed 
their financial performance, operational performance, and knowledge diffusion 
characteristics for different values of the willingness to help parameter. 
  
FIGURE 5: Objective function value for different 
values of network density  
FIGURE 6: Average total task time for different 
values of network density  
  
FIGURE 7: Strong ties used per worker for 
different values of network density  
FIGURE 8: Cumulative strong tie gain for different 
values of network density  
  
FIGURE 9: Weak ties used per worker for different 
values of network density  
FIGURE 10: Cumulative weak tie gain for 
different values of network density  
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FIGURE 11: Performative ties used per worker for 
different values of network density  
FIGURE 12: Cumulative performative tie gain for 
different values of network density  
We observe that the financial performance (Figure 5) and operational 
performance (Figure 6) increase as networks become denser. Additionally, we notice 
that RN outperform the other network topologies
5
. However, the difference between 
RN, and the other two network topologies, decreases as network density increases. 
These results are driven by knowledge sharing behavior, which in turn, depends on 
network topology and network density. Next, we analyze knowledge sharing behavior 
in detail. 
Recall that, in our model the total time a worker spends on a task is a function of 
his effective competence, which in turn depends on extent of knowledge acquired from 
co-workers. And the extent of knowledge exchange between two co-workers depends 
on the type of tie shared and the competence difference between them. Typically, strong 
ties are the preferred method of consultation, since they have a higher willingness to 
help and the least overhead coefficient (Baum and Berta, 1999; Hansen and Løvås, 
2004; Levine and Kurzban, 2006). However, the number of strong ties that each worker 
has is limited. Weak ties have a lower willingness to help, but are greater in number as 
compared to strong ties. Finally, performative ties allow a worker to connect to any 
                                                 
5
 Based on average performance over 50 replications 
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worker in the system, and although they are the most in number, they are the least 
efficient in terms of both willingness to help and the overhead of providing help. The 
average number of strong ties per node increases as network density increases. Since 
strong ties are the most effective means of acquiring knowledge, this accounts for 
improved financial and operational performance with increase in network density 
(Figures 5, 6). Also, as network density increases to relatively high values, the three 
network topologies tend to become similar, reducing performance differences between 
them.  
While the number of strong ties is the same across the three network structures, 
the type of knowledge sharing behavior invoked by each network structure is very 
different. This is largely driven by the fact that as workers acquire knowledge from each 
other to perform tasks; cliques tend to become similar over time (in terms of knowledge 
vectors of workers). Therefore, the amount of knowledge gained by using strong and 
weak ties within cliques becomes limited as compared to using same ties from outside 
the clique, if they exist. In addition, within cliques there is a high overlap between the 
strong and weak ties, making weak ties redundant. As discussed earlier, CN have no or 
very few strong and weak ties outside cliques. In contrast, RN have very few cliques 
and many strong and weak ties distributed across the network. SN are somewhere in the 
middle with a small number of cliques having connections across them.  
For reasons discussed earlier, workers in all three network topologies, prefer to 
use strong ties, therefore the number of strong ties used per worker (Figure 7) is much 
higher than weak tie (Figure 9) and performative tie use (Figure 11). Note that, the 
number of strong ties used is about the same for all three network topologies (Figure 7). 
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However, RN, and SN use a much larger number of weak ties (Figure 9), compared to 
CN, which uses a much larger number of performative ties (Figure 11). Figures 8, 10, 
and 12 indicate that RN benefits most from strong and weak tie use, in terms of 
knowledge gained and CN benefits the least, since workers in cliques tend to be similar. 
In essence, we find that the RN invokes the most efficient knowledge sharing behavior 
between workers and this explains why it outperforms SN and CN. 
TABLE 3: Min/Max/Average performance differences across network structures 
Objective Function Value Difference (% Improvement) 
Network 
Density (%) 
SN over CN RN over CN 
 
Avg. Min Max Avg. Min Max 
10 51.4 10.2 232.3 134.6 25.5 459.0 
12 22.7 1.5 393.3 50.7 13.6 1132.9 
14 12.6 -5.7 280.9 28.9 6.2 531.9 
16 13.1 -0.2 73.2 19.2 -3.4 151.4 
18 7.9 -0.5 77.3 13.4 -5.8 100.3 
20 6.8 -3.1 21.2 11.5 -3.8 71.5 
 
  
FIGURE 13: Average knowledge level for 
different values of network density  
FIGURE 14: Worker specialization for different 
values of network denstity 
In addition to the average analysis, we also studied minimum and maximum 
performance differences across the three network structure (Table 3). We observed that 
when network density is high, it is possible for some sample paths (less than 2.5% of all 
instances) that CN slightly outperforms (by less than 0.5-6%) RN or SN. This suggests 
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that, on occasion, when network density is high, the experts may be nicely distributed 
amongst CN cliques, such that it is able to slightly outperform the other networks. 
However, for the most part (viz., on average across all instances), for the reasons 
already provided, CN performs poorly compared to SN and RN, in that order. 
These effects are further illustrated in Figures 13 and 14, where we plot the 
average knowledge level of workers and average worker specialization (coefficient of 
variation of competence across skills for all workers). In every time period t, the 
standard deviation of competence across S skills of worker k is given by kt . Hence, the 
average coefficient of variation of competence across skills over all workers is, 
 
 
K
k
S
s
kstkt WSK
1 1
)/()/1(  . Each clique in a CN may contain a subset of experts and this 
limits both the amount and range of knowledge that can be gained by individuals in that 
clique. In RN and SN, which have no or very few cliques, workers have access to a 
greater number of experts. Hence, there is greater knowledge diffusion in RN and SN, 
resulting in a higher knowledge level (Figure 13) compared to CN. It is important to 
note that knowledge diffusion (due to consultation) when a task requires multiple skills 
is different compared to knowledge diffusion in a scenario where a task requires only 
one skill. In the former scenario, each worker is able to improve his expertise in 
multiple skills, when performing tasks. In the latter case, since workers are assigned to 
tasks that require only one skill, learning during task assignment results in improved 
competency in that skill. In this case, repeated assignments, which use the skill that the 
worker is most proficient in lead to further specialization and higher knowledge 
variance (Figure 14). Therefore, when a task requires one (two) skill, each consultation 
increases (decreases), knowledge variability across skills. Given that RN better facilitate 
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help seeking behavior, RN results in higher (lower) worker specialization when a task 
requires one (two) skill(s), compared to CN. 
Note that increasing network density has the most impact in the case of CN and 
least in the case of RN (Figures 5, 6, 13, 14). The marginal value of additional 
neighbors is highest in the case of CN. CN are dependent on strong ties for knowledge 
transfer and benefit much more from access to new expertise, compared to RN and SN, 
which can access a broader range of help sources (outside cliques). 
2.6.2 Impact of Cost of Providing Help on Relative Network Performance 
In order to extend the robustness of the model trends seen thus far, we study the 
relative performance of the different network structures as we increase the cost of 
providing help. Note that, in these experiments the cost of providing help is increased in 
such a way that the relative cost of providing help via strong, weak or performative ties 
is maintained. As the overhead from providing help increases it is beneficial to acquire 
knowledge from only those co-workers where the knowledge gain can offset the cost. In 
other words, for a worker to be able to use his closest ties (strong and weak) it is critical 
that there be enough heterogeneity in skills across workers in his closest network (i.e, 
more potential for knowledge gain). The lack of enough heterogeneity in closest ties 
results in a reduction in the use of closest ties, increased use of performative ties, and 
reduced financial performance (Figure 15). In addition, we find that as the cost of 
providing help decreases the difference between network structures decreases. Since 
RN invokes the most efficient help sharing behavior, for reasons discussed in Section 
2.6.1, RN continues to outperform SN and CN, in that order
6
.  
                                                 
6
 It is trivial to see that, if the overhead of providing help is high enough to preclude access to co-
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FIGURE 15: Impact of different overhead 
coefficient of helping on objective function value 
FIGURE 16: Periods between successive 
assignments for different network density 
2.6.3 Impact of Various Parameters on Assignment Decision Dynamics 
Recall that the DAH uses OPLA to make a decision whether to wait for one 
period or make an assignment during that time period. We refer to this as the 
assignment decision. Hence, the time between successive assignments is dynamic and 
could be multiple time periods. The assignment decision is related to the costs and 
benefits of keeping tasks waiting or workers idle in the system. As discussed earlier, we 
assign a wait-time penalty for each time period that a task is waiting in the system. 
Also, the firm continues to pay out wages to all workers that are kept on bench. The 
benefit comes from the fact that, in each assignment period, the firm can now choose 
from a larger pool of un-assigned tasks and workers, with varying competences, 
resulting in improved assignments of tasks to workers. Thus, the net benefit from 
waiting to make an assignment depends on the number of tasks waiting to be assigned 
and the magnitude of the wait-time penalty. Hence, we study how the assignment 
decision depends on various factors such as, worker heterogeneity and network density. 
Worker heterogeneity refers to the variation in skill levels across workers, for a 
given number of workers. Recall that the intuition behind delaying assignment is that 
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the firm can choose from a larger pool of un-assigned tasks and workers with varying 
competences. Therefore, when there is significant worker heterogeneity, waiting results 
in better task to worker assignments (in terms of revenue from task completion and 
future value of learning). This is because there is a greater degree of mismatch between 
workers‟ competence level and the requirement of the arriving tasks. Conversely, for 
homogenous workers it is trivial to see that there would be no value of waiting. This is 
illustrated in Figure 16 where the average number of time periods between assignments 
for a low value of worker heterogeneity (0.40) is less than that for higher values of 
worker heterogeneity (0.45). This intuition can also be interpreted in terms of real 
options theory (Trigeorgis, 1996) and is discussed in Section 2.10. 
Figure 16, also plots the average number of time periods between assignments 
as a function of network density. Increasing network density increases the pool of 
available workers through strong ties and results in higher knowledge levels (Figure 13) 
and lower worker heterogeneity (not shown here). Hence, increasing network density 
reduces the value of waiting and results in more frequent assignments. Another 
important factor that affects the frequency of assignments is the wait-time penalty 
associated with un-assigned tasks. Since CN have the lowest average knowledge levels 
(Figure 13) and highest task completion times (Figure 6), they tend to have a larger 
number of tasks waiting in the system (hence largest wait-time penalty). This explains 
why the number of periods between assignments is the smallest for CN. 
2.7 Performance Evaluation of DAH 
2.7.1 Comparison with MIP Solution (using CPLEX) 
To evaluate the performance of our heuristic, we solve the MIP formulation 
using CPLEX for small problem instances and compare it against the solution using 
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DAH. This methodology is consistent with prior research (Dawande et al., 2008; Kumar 
et al., 2007). Particularly, we compare the CPEX gap (% difference between CPLEX 
solution and CPLEX upper bound) to the DAH gap (% difference between DAH 
solution and CPLEX upper bound (or optimal solution, where applicable)).  
All experiments were run using CPLEX (Version 12.1) on Core 2 Duo E4500 
computers (2.2GHz, 3GB RAM) with Windows XP as the operating system. We 
allowed each instance to run for 10 hours to get a reasonable solution (in terms of 
CPLEX Gap). We also used the DAH (coded in NetLogo and Java) to solve the same 
instances.  
The problem size is restricted due to the long compute times involved in 
CPLEX. Still, we design our experiments such that several model parameters that can 
affect the heuristic performance are varied, while staying within limits of reasonable 
problem size/complexity for CPLEX. These parameters include the wait-time penalty, 
the heterogeneity of workforce competence, planning horizon, task per period and 
average task time. We chose multiple (2 or 3) levels for each of these parameters giving 
us a total of 48 (3*2
4
) problem classes. Within each of the 48 classes, ten problem 
instances were generated (by taking draws from the relevant distributions for uncertain 
parameters as outlined in Section 2.3.1.4). The results of the solution comparison 
between MIP and DAH are reported in Table 4. For completeness, we provide the 
minimum and maximum performance GAP of DAH, in addition to the average over all 
sample paths. In each case, for the sample path that results in minimum and maximum 
performance of DAH, we also record the corresponding CPLEX GAP. This helps us 
approach the worst case performance of DAH when compared with CPLEX. 
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TABLE 4: Percentage gap of DAH results from CPLEX solution
*
 
 
* 
Number of Workers = 15, CPLEX Gap = (CPLEX Upper Bound – CPLEX Solution)/CPLEX Upper 
Bound; DAH Gap = (CPLEX Upper Bound – DAH Solution)/CPLEX Upper Bound 
** 
Optimal Solution for CPLEX, therefore, DAH Gap = (CPLEX Optimal Solution – DAH Solution) / 
CPLEX Optimal Solution, N/A – CPLEX solution was not obtained 
ID 
Penalty 
Coefficient 
Worker 
Heterogeneity 
Planning 
Horizon 
Task Per 
Period 
Average 
Task Time 
DAH Gap (%) CPLEX Gap (%) 
      Avg Min  Max  Avg Min  Max  
1 
0.1 
N(1,0.35) 
10 
6 3 4.6 2.7 6.8 16.9 12.1 18.3 
2 6 6 7.0 5.6 8.9 N/A N/A N/A 
3 3 3 4.0 2.8 4.9 14.4 12.8 16.4 
4 3 6 4.1 3.3 5.2 15.2 14.4 16.5 
5 
6 
6 3 3.6 1.7 4.8 9.9 8.4 7.0 
6 6 6 5.0 3.6 7.1 6.9 7.7 9.3 
7 3 3 2.1 1.2 3.1 7.9 7.0 5.3 
8 3 6 3.5 0.5 5.7 4.0 0.7 5.7 
9 
N(1,0.45) 
10 
6 3 3.1 0.2 4.6 15.6 11.0 19.6 
10 6 6 6.8 6.0 7.3 N/A N/A N/A 
11 3 3 3.1 2.0 4.3 9.7 8.3 10.6 
12 3 6 4.0 3.4 4.7 13.8 13.3 14.7 
13 
6 
6 3 2.9 1.1 4.5 9.1 8.4 7.0 
14 6 6 3.9 3.2 4.2 9.8 7.7 12.6 
15 3 3 2.3 0.5 3.9 8.6 7.0 5.3 
16 3 6 3.3 2.0 5.0 6.8 2.0 10.4 
17 
0.3 
N(1,0.35) 
10 
6 3 3.5 1.7 5.5 12.6 7.9 15.8 
18 6 6 6.6 2.9 10.0 N/A N/A N/A 
19 3 3 3.1 1.6 4.6 10.1 8.8 11.9 
20 3 6 3.1 2.0 5.1 13.1 10.7 15.5 
21 
6 
6 3 1.0 0.1 1.9 7.9 6.1 10.0 
22 6 6 3.8 1.4 5.2 6.2 0.0** 10.8 
23 3 3 0.7 0.3 1.4 7.0 5.8 8.5 
24 3 6 1.5 0.3 3.0 2.4 0.0** 8.0 
25 
N(1,0.45) 
10 
6 3 2.7 0.1 3.6 12.9 9.1 16.8 
26 6 6 6.4 4.1 7.5 N/A N/A N/A 
27 3 3 1.8 0.9 2.3 9.3 8.4 11.8 
28 3 6 2.9 1.8 5.0 12.1 9.9 15.6 
29 
6 
6 3 1.5 0.1 3.0 7.5 5.7 9.1 
30 6 6 3.9 3.0 5.4 6.6 2.1 9.9 
31 3 3 0.4 0.0 1.1 6.3 5.3 7.4 
32 3 6 1.4 0.5 2.6 3.1 0.0** 7.9 
 33 
0.5 
N(1,0.35) 
10 
6 3 2.9 1.5 3.9 11.0 7.7 15.9 
34 6 6 5.7 3.2 7.0 15.9 14.2 17.6 
35 3 3 1.8 1.4 2.3 8.8 8.3 10.0 
36 3 6 2.6 2.2 3.1 12.7 11.1 14.0 
37 
6 
6 3 1.7 0.9 3.0 7.8 6.1 9.0 
38 6 6 3.7 1.5 5.6 5.1 0.0** 9.0 
39 3 3 0.8 0.6 1.1 6.2 5.4 7.7 
40 3 6 1.6 0.2 3.1 1.6 0.0** 6.3 
41 
N(1,0.45) 
10 
6 3 1.7 0.2 2.7 10.3 7.9 12.0 
42 6 6 5.2 3.4 6.5 N/A N/A N/A 
43 3 3 1.5 0.7 2.1 6.7 5.4 7.4 
44 3 6 2.4 1.4 3.6 10.3 9.0 13.6 
45 
6 
6 3 1.7 0.4 2.5 6.1 5.5 7.6 
46 6 6 3.9 2.9 5.0 N/A N/A N/A 
47 3 3 0.6 0.1 1.3 5.1 4.5 6.3 
48 3 6 1.2 0.1 2.3 0.1 0.0** 0.3 
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First, for the problem instances that CPLEX solves to optimality, the DAH 
solution is also near-optimal (≤1.4% DAH GAP). For all other problems, where 
CPLEX cannot be solved to optimality, we compare against the CPLEX upper bound. 
In these cases, it can be seen that our DAH provides significantly better lower bounds 
than CPLEX solution (on average < 5% DAH GAP), across the wide variety of problem 
classes. Even when we compare the minimum and maximum DAH GAP, over all 
sample paths and across all problem classes, the performance of DAH is very robust. 
Finally, in terms of compute time, the DAH solution is obtained in a few seconds 
compared to 10 hours for CPLEX. Next we discuss how some of the model parameters 
affect the DAH performance. 
The DAH solution gets closer to the upper bound when worker heterogeneity 
increases. This is because, when worker heterogeneity is high, there is more benefit 
from waiting to make assignments and value of learning from co-workers. Both these 
effects are captured by DAH. Similarly, as wait-time penalty increases or the planning 
horizon decreases, the DAH assumption of looking only one-period ahead before 
making assignment decisions becomes more realistic. Hence, for the most part, we find 
that as wait time penalty increases or planning horizon decreases, DAH gap also 
decreases. On the other hand, as the average task time increases, workers take longer to 
become available. Hence, the OPLA scheme becomes less optimal, since we would like 
to look further down the planning horizon (more than one period) before making 
assignment decisions. This explains why the DAH gap, for most part, increases with 
average task time. In such scenarios, DAH performance can be improved by adjusting 
the length of the assignment period ( ) in proportion with the task times. Finally, as the 
55 
 
number of tasks per period increases, the need for finding the optimal worker-to-task 
assignment increases, in order to compensate for wait time penalty. In this situation, the 
OPLA scheme again becomes less optimal, resulting in a higher DAH gap. 
2.7.2 Comparison with Greedy Heuristic  
We also compared the performance of DAH with a Greedy heuristic. The main 
distinction of the greedy approach is that (a) at every period, the greedy heuristic makes 
the best available worker-to-task assignment without pre-fetching any benefits from 
learning in the current period on future performance and, (b) it does not use OPLA. In 
Figure 17, we plot the performance difference between DAH and greedy approach 
versus network density. The problem parameters are identical to those in Section 2.5. It 
is evident from the data that the DAH significantly outperforms the greedy approach 
(Table 5). Note that the performance benefit of DAH over greedy reduces as network 
density increases. This is because an increase in network density facilitates better 
knowledge diffusion, i.e., reduces knowledge heterogeneity across workers and 
increases average knowledge level. This in turn, reduces the value of dynamic 
assignments and learning from consultation, resulting in a lower performance difference 
versus the greedy heuristic.  
TABLE 5: Percentage improvement of DAH over Greedy approach 
DAH over Greedy (% Improvement) 
# of 
neighbors 
CN  SN RN 
Avg Min Max Avg Min Max Avg Min Max 
10 240.0 37.5 763.5 151.5 24.4 1557.5 80.7 14.5 2198.4 
12 102.7 26.3 2158.8 80.3 22.0 449.5 55.7 15.5 202.5 
14 72.8 19.5 940.2 63.5 16.6 234.5 47.9 13.8 149.6 
16 53.2 16.3 251.0 41.9 17.0 128.4 38.0 12.2 119.5 
18 43.8 14.9 198.4 38.0 12.6 134.0 33.7 11.4 89.1 
20 38.4 12.3 126.9 33.0 10.5 97.8 29.1 9.5 81.7 
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FIGURE 17: Comparison between DAH and 
Greedy approach for different values of network 
density 
FIGURE 18: Impact of worker initial heterogeneity 
on DAH performance over Greedy approach. 
Network density = 10% 
 
 
FIGURE 19: Impact of different knowledge 
retention coefficient on DAH performance over 
Greedy approach. Network density = 10% 
For similar reasons, it is easy to see that the performance advantage of the DAH 
heuristic would reduce as worker heterogeneity reduces (Figure 18). A similar trend is 
expected when the knowledge retention rate is high, since it facilitates rapid diffusion of 
knowledge. This reduces the value of learning from co-workers as well as benefit of 
waiting to make an assignment (Figure 19). 
2.7.3 Comparison with Periodic Assignment Heuristic 
Finally, we also compare the performance of DAH with a Periodic Assignment 
Heuristic. The main distinction is that in the Periodic Assignment Heuristic, we choose 
a fixed number of periods between successive assignments for the entire planning 
horizon. Particularly, we calculate marginal revenue and marginal cost for different 
values of number of periods between assignments (i.e., 1, 2, 3, etc) and select the value 
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at which marginal revenue is equal to marginal cost. In contrast, recall that in DAH the 
periods between assignments are dynamic and controlled by the OPLA scheme. It is 
important to note that in the Periodic Assignment Heuristic, similar to DAH, we pre-
fetch the value of learning in the current period on future periods. In Figure 20, it can be 
seen that the DAH significantly outperforms the Periodic Assignment Heuristic
 
(Table 
6). However, for the same reasons discussed in Section 2.7.2, the relative benefit of 
DAH over the Periodic Assignment Heuristic decreases as network density increases. It 
is important to note that the performance advantage of DAH also reduces for high 
values of wait time penalty (Figure 21). In this case, assignments are more likely to be 
made every period, making the distinctive feature of the DAH viz., dynamic assignment 
via OPLA, less critical. 
  
FIGURE 20: Comparison between DAH and 
Periodic Assignment Heuristic for different 
network density 
FIGURE 21: Comparison between DAH and 
Periodic Assignment Heuristic for different wait 
time penalty coefficient 
 
TABLE 6: Percentage improvement of DAH over periodic assignment policy 
DAH over Periodic Assignment Policy (% Improvement) 
# of 
neighbors 
CN SN RN 
Avg Min Max Avg Min Max Avg Min Max 
10 104.3 9.4 402.6 51.3 5.5 599.3 19.9 2.1 732.0 
12 34.9 5.1 817.6 21.1 4.7 124.0 11.2 1.2 51.7 
14 23.3 1.2 298.2 15.0 3.0 61.5 10.4 2.1 38.0 
16 14.8 1.1 61.5 8.1 2.2 22.4 6.5 1.8 20.5 
18 11.0 1.3 39.6 7.9 2.3 33.6 5.8 2.2 17.6 
20 9.4 1.5 30.4 6.0 1.2 21.7 4.6 2.4 14.1 
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2.8 Model Extension 
2.8.1 Using Training to Reduce Differences Between Networks 
As discussed earlier, the extent of knowledge exchange (and hence knowledge 
diffusion) between co-workers depends on the type of network structure. However, it 
may not be possible to easily alter the organizational network structure of a firm, in 
order to improve knowledge diffusion. Therefore, we propose an extension to the basic 
model (outlined in Section 2.3) where a firm can use training as a means to effectively 
improve the knowledge diffusion process. The firm can provide an opportunity for 
workers to undertake training and improve competence in one or more skills, in addition 
to consulting other co-workers. By allowing workers to take training, the firm can 
mitigate some of the drawbacks associated with SN and CN. Specifically, training can 
be used to strategically ensure that specialized knowledge does not get limited to 
cliques and that access to knowledge across all workers becomes homogenous.  
The use of training is prevalent in knowledge management literature. Chen and 
Edgington (2005) discuss two factors affecting knowledge acquisition through training. 
One factor is the sophistication of the knowledge provided in the training, which 
determines the maximum gain in competence (for a skill) that a worker could obtain 
after undergoing training. The other factor is the trainee‟s learning rate which is affected 
by unique, individual mental models (Anderson, 1995). Hence, the same training could 
result in different competence gains for different workers. In our model, st  represents 
the maximum competence level offered by a training session, in skill s in assignment 
period t. We assume that not all training sessions are equally efficient. In addition, 
)1,0(sk  represents the learning rate associated with worker k for a training session in 
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skill s.  
In this extension, we allow workers to be engaged in training, in addition to be 
assigned to service tasks at any point in time. The revenue (from task completion), 
bench-cost (from idle workers), and wait time penalties (from tasks waiting in the 
system), are calculated similar to Section 2.3. There are two types of costs associated 
with training. First is a direct cost, related to the wages paid out to workers when in 
training. We model this as a product of the worker‟s wage rate ( kh ) and the time 
required to complete the training ( st ). The second cost is indirect, and is related to the 
fact that assigning a worker to training makes him unavailable for any other task. As a 
result, the firm might incur additional wait-time penalties on tasks waiting in the system 
while the worker is in training. This is modeled by adding an additional assignment 
constraint to the MIP in Section 2.3. The benefit associated with training comes from 
the improvement in the worker competence after training. Similar to learning from co-
workers (as modeled in Section 2.3), this improved competence allows the worker to 
complete future tasks more efficiently. Here, skstkstW  )(   is the potential improvement 
in the worker‟s competence after undergoing training. 1kstY  (decision variable) 
indicates that worker k has been assigned to a training session in skill s in period t (and 
0 otherwise), and 1smtL  if a training in skill s that started in period m is completed by 
period t (and 0 otherwise). Consequently, worker k‟s competence in period t is, 

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In Figure 22, we study how the competence offered by training affects the firm‟s 
performance. We find that, adding training as a means of knowledge acquisition 
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benefits the organization, irrespective of the network structure. It is important to note 
that CN benefit the most from offering training (highest percentage increase compared 
to SN and RN) as well as from increasing the level of competence offered by training 
(highest slope compared to SN and RN). This is because training enhances the 
knowledge diffusion and acquisition process by ensuring that knowledge does not get 
stuck in cliques in CN and SN. Although RN continue to outperform (not shown), they 
are least sensitive to the competence offered by training. 
  
FIGURE 22: Impact of training competence level 
on objective function value 
FIGURE 23: Impact of learning by doing on 
objective function value 
2.8.2 Incorporating Learning By Doing 
As discussed earlier, we allow workers to improve competence in one or more 
skills based on consultation with other co-workers. However, it may be possible that 
due to cost overhead, worker availability, etc., a worker may have to complete a task 
without any help from co-workers. In such a case, the worker may be able to improve 
his competence, simply by virtue of completing tasks (even if there was no consultation 
involved). This can be interpreted as “learning-by-doing”. Therefore, we propose an 
extension to the basic model (outlined in Section 2.3) where a worker‟s competence can 
improve through “learning-by-doing”, in addition to “learning from others”. We 
propose the extent of learning-by-doing in skill s depends on three components: (a) 
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proportion of time spent in skill s when completing task j )/.,.(
1


S
s
jsjsei  , (b) worker 
k‟s current competence )( ksmW , since we expect that the potential for learning-by-doing 
is greatest when the worker is less competent, and (c) individual worker‟s learning 
efficiency ( s
k ) (Anderson, 1995; Chen and Edgington, 2005). Therefore, worker k‟s 
competence in period t is given by, 
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learning-by-doing.  
In Figure 23, as expected, we find that the all the three network structures 
benefit from learning by doing, and this benefit increases as the learning efficiency 
increases. In addition, similar to training, we find that CN benefit the most from 
learning by doing, and RN benefit the least. Hence firms could encourage learning-by-
doing to improve the performance of existing CN and SN.  
2.9 Limitations and Future Research 
Worker competence, in this research, was initially generated randomly and then 
allowed to evolve based on task performance, knowledge sharing, learning-by-doing, 
and training using one training policy. Alternative training policies such as deliberate 
cross-training in conjunction with recruitment decisions could be evaluated. Our 
research has used one model of learning by doing. Future research could explore other 
models. The results presented in this dissertation assume knowledge depreciation is 
negligible. Future research could study KISDN performance under high knowledge 
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depreciation conditions. While we have assumed a fixed compensation structure, the 
model could be extended to compare different compensation structures. This 
dissertation assumed that the arrival of tasks are independent based on a wide variety of 
service research (Buco et al., 2003; Sen et al., 2009). Future research could examine 
interdependent task arrivals, for example by extending the unit of analysis in this 
dissertation (a single KISDN) to multiple interrelated KISDNs. This extension would be 
analogous studying queuing networks (Bolch, 2006) and is likely to be more complex 
and computation-intensive. This research has assumed a fixed capacity (workers). 
Future research could examine interrelated capacity planning and task assignment 
decisions. We concentrate on individual-oriented service tasks. However, one could 
consider a team-oriented service scenario. Modeling such a scenario is similar to 
modeling a project and would depend on the structure of the project and the team. Our 
focus has been on task assignment. However, organizations might be interested in other 
objectives such as maximizing knowledge sharing, for future use. Alternative model 
formulations to study this are interesting areas of future research.  
2.10 Discussion and Conclusion 
Trends in networking, globalization and evolution of software as a service are 
increasing the importance of studying KISDN. In our opinion, managing KISDN is an 
important aspect of the emerging discipline of service science, which is of increasing 
interest to MIS researchers.
 
To the best of our knowledge the MIP model presented in 
this dissertation and the DAH represent the first attempt to systematically analyze an 
important and complex research question in the context of delivering IT as a service. 
Since the KISDN optimization problem is NP hard, the DAH represents a reasonable 
approach to solving this problem for realistic problem sizes. The value of such 
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analytical modeling lies in the identification and integration of parameters and 
relationships into a framework that help to structure the debate on how to manage 
KISDN (Lusch et al., 2008).  
Our analysis has indicated that organizations can benefit from not assigning 
service tasks immediately (by using dynamic assignment). In other words, waiting to 
make an assignment is valuable since it results in higher revenue due to better task to 
worker assignment. Each assignment decision can be conceptualized as making an 
investment (incurring costs) in return for revenue. At any point in time, an organization 
has the option to make such an investment or to defer the investment. Exercising the 
option (making an assignment), in turn results in the option to make another investment 
(assignment) in the next period. As seen in our results, the value of such an option 
increases with increased uncertainty of the underlying asset (worker heterogeneity). 
Such a scenario can also be thought of as a compound or nested exchange option which 
can be valued analytically only in some special cases (Trigeorgis, 1996). 
To the best of our knowledge, this research is the first to propose how the 
information flow network can be combined with worker competence information to 
improve operational and financial performance of KISDN. Specifically, we integrate 
literature and tools for mining information flow networks (Guy et al., 2008; Van Der 
Aalst et al., 2005) with literature and tools for measuring knowledge competencies 
(Cross et al., 2001; Davenport and Prusak, 1998) and propose combining these two 
types of tools to provide information that can be used for task assignment. Our results 
also underscore importance of weak ties in improving organizational performance. 
Recognizing the importance of weak ties and nurturing them, in our opinion, is an 
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important managerial implication from our results. 
Organizations may currently resemble CN or SN and not RN. Our results 
indicate that organizations could improve knowledge transfer by creating RNs. Ways of 
doing this include job rotation, and facilitating communication between key individuals 
(Davenport et al., 1998). Complete reorganization to RN may be expensive or 
infeasible. Our results indicate that improving network density, particularly in the case 
of CN could significantly improve knowledge transfer and consequently organizational 
performance. Creating SN by means of links between cliques is also desirable, 
particularly at higher network densities. Also, in cases where it is non-trivial for 
organizations to change the organizational network structure, managers should focus on 
strategically training workers or providing incentives to improve worker‟s willingness 
to help, in order to maximize performance. Encouraging learning by doing may also 
complement other knowledge management strategies. It is hoped that this research will 
serve as useful framework for IS researchers as well as practitioners interested in 
knowledge management, service science and social networks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3: UNDERSTANDING KEY ISSUES IN DESIGNING AND USING 
INFORMATION FLOW NETWORKS IN THE CONTEXT OF  
KNOWLEDGE-INTENSIVE SERVICE DELIVERY  
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
There is a growing recognition that employees‟ knowledge is an organization‟s 
most valuable asset, particularly in knowledge-intensive environments such as 
consulting, research, and IT service delivery (Dong et al., 2011; Davenport et al., 1997; 
Dyer and Nabeoaka, 2000). Prior IS research has also recognized that “making personal 
knowledge available to others is the central activity of the knowledge-creating 
company. It takes place continuously and at all levels of the organization” (Nonaka et 
al., 2000). Hence, firms are increasingly investing in Knowledge Management (KM) 
projects expecting to improve employees‟ knowledge levels (Goh, 2002). For example, 
McKinsey has long had an objective of spending 10% of its revenues on developing and 
managing intellectual capital (Davenport et al., 1997). Buckman Laboratories estimated 
that the firm would spend 7% of its revenues on knowledge management (Davenport et 
al., 1997). The global KM market had been projected to reach 8.8 billion dollars during 
2005 (Malhotra, 2005). Most KM research has thus far focused on information 
technologies (Cross et al., 2001; Davenport and Prusak, 1998), with relatively little 
discussion on how knowledge can be shared effectively among employees using 
organizational social relationships (Levine and Prietula, 2006). In practice, however, 
organizations are finding that employees often prefer to consult their peers and 
colleagues (organizational social relationships) in order to acquire knowledge, rather 
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than access electronic knowledge bases (Cross et al., 2001). Hence, this research 
focuses on better understanding how organizations can maximize knowledge transfer 
among interconnected employees. 
Recognizing the importance of using organizational social relationships to 
transfer knowledge, an increasing number of Chief Knowledge Officers (CKOs) are 
moving from a technological KM strategy to a socialization-based strategy. Such a 
strategy uses IT-facilitated information flow networks (IFNs) to facilitate knowledge 
sharing (Nicolas, 2004). These IFNs use ties (or information flow connections) between 
individuals in order to transfer knowledge. As discussed in the chapter 2, organizations 
can effectively capture existing IFNs. Furthermore, in the chapter 2, we show that the 
structure of the information flow networks and associated knowledge sharing behavior 
significantly impact organizational performance and employees‟ knowledge level. 
Prior research suggests that organizations can create organizational relationships 
through actions such as co-location, project and work group assignments, facilitating 
communication through technology tools, and incentives (Kotlarsky and Oshri, 2005; 
Lengnick-Hall and Lengnick-Hall, 2003, Nonaka et al., 2000). These relationships, in 
turn, facilitate information flow. Hence, we focus on how organizations should design 
and use their information flow network such that knowledge sharing is maximized. We 
seek to better understand which organizational factors should be considered when 
designing and using such networks. Such an understanding facilitates effective design 
and use of effective information flow networks in KISDN, and is an important, yet 
under-researched area (IBM, 2006; Leung and Glissmann, 2010).  
Consistent with chapter two, we study organizations in knowledge-intensive 
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service delivery environment, where organizations support multiple skills, have varying 
levels of worker competence, and require knowledge sharing among co-workers. 
However, we focus on the objective of maximizing employees‟ knowledge gain through 
sharing in this Chapter. More specifically, we have focused on the following research 
question: how should organizations design and use their information flow networks in 
order to maximize employees’ knowledge gain (over a planning horizon) through 
sharing under different organizational environments? We formulate a Mixed Integer 
Programming Model (MIP), and present a heuristic in order to facilitate systematic 
analysis and understanding of the above research question. In trying to answer this 
question, we examine organizations with different distributions of expertise and 
examine the optimal information flow networks.  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides a review of 
related literature. This is followed by the model development in section 3.3. A heuristic 
is proposed in section 3.4 to solve the problem. Selected numerical results are presented 
in section 3.5. Limitations and conclusions are provided in section 3.6 and 3.7. 
3.2 Literature Review 
Our research integrates concepts from prior research on knowledge view of the 
organization (Alavi and Leidner, 2001; Grant, 1996; Nonaka et al., 2000), creating and 
using social relationships to facilitate knowledge sharing (Davenport et al., 1997; Sahoo 
et al., 2008), efficiency and tradeoffs associated with knowledge sharing (Borgatti and 
Cross, 2003; Hansen, 2002), and modeling knowledge exchange in organizations 
(Cowan and Jonard, 2004; Levine and Prietula, 2006). 
3.2.1 Knowledge View of the Organization 
The knowledge-based view of the organization (Grant, 1996) argues that 
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knowledge resides within individual workers, and the primary role of the organization is 
knowledge application. In addition, this view of the organization also recognizes that 
knowledge transfer is a critical determinant of sustainable competitive advantage 
(Grant, 1996).  
Nonaka et al. (2000) also argue that “knowledge and the capability to create and 
utilize such knowledge are the most important sources of a firm‟s sustainable 
competitive advantage”. They propose that researchers look inside the firm, and focus 
on the activity, strategy, structure, and culture of the firm, to see how it produces 
knowledge. They also identify several important factors that impact knowledge 
creation. Such factors include knowledge vision, organizational forms, incentive 
systems, corporate culture and organizational routines, and leadership. Knowledge 
vision determines what types of knowledge are created, and “the value system that 
evaluates, justifies and determines the quality of knowledge” (Nonaka et al., 2000). 
Organizational forms represent the way that the organization is configured and 
structured. Incentives such as monetary compensation, peer recognition, and the sense 
of belonging can effectively motivate knowledge sharing. Organizational culture and 
organizational routines, and leadership could either promote or hinder organizational 
knowledge creation. 
Alavi and Leidner (2001) highlight that “it is less the knowledge existing at any 
given time per se than the firm‟s ability to effectively apply the existing knowledge to 
create new knowledge and to take action that forms the basis for achieving competitive 
advantage from knowledge-based assets.” Furthermore, they claim that information 
technologies may play an important role in effectuating the knowledge-based view of 
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the firm. Knowledge management within organizations can be facilitated by advanced 
information technologies. 
3.2.2 Creating and Using Organizational Social Relationships to Share Knowledge 
Prior research suggests that organization relationships can be created using a 
variety of activities. For example, Hansen (1999) examine knowledge sharing across 
organizational subunits and find that establishing long-term collaboration relationships 
between different subunits can be used to facilitate knowledge transfer. However, 
people in a subunit are required to spend time cultivating such relationships through 
frequent visits to and meetings with people in another subunit. Kotlarsky and Oshri 
(2005) present two case studies carried out at SAP and LeCroy to illustrate the 
importance of establishing social ties and sharing of knowledge among distributed IS 
development teams. Their cases suggest that facilitating face-to-face interactions is an 
effective mechanism for creating social relationships. In particular, a short visit to a 
remote location prior to a formal introduction of the team, and non-hierarchical 
communication with high quality messages through open community channels after 
face-to-face activities, is important for establishing social relationships between team 
members. Lengnick-Hall and Lengnick-Hall (2003) study the problem of adopting a 
human resource management approach to build relationships that turn social capital into 
competitive advantage. They argue that through building and nurturing relationships, 
organizations can locate and share knowledge rapidly and respond to market changes. 
They propose the use of work teams and project teams to establish relationships among 
workers. Work teams often remain intact for long periods and have time to develop 
trust. But project teams need to develop and adjust relationships quickly to be effective. 
However, great care needs to be exercised when creating and using 
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organizational IFNs for knowledge management. For example, lack of knowledge 
sharing caused by inefficient IFNs in Chrysler Corporation results in significant 
decrease in performance (Lengnick-Hall and Lengnick-Hall, 2003). In summary, 
organizations can effectively create social relationships and facilitate knowledge 
transfer using such relationships. Yet, we underscore the importance of paying careful 
attention to the design of such information flow networks. 
3.2.3 Efficiency and Trade-offs Associated with Knowledge Sharing 
This research is also related to the efficiency of knowledge sharing. Prior 
research demonstrates that the strength of the social relationship significantly affects the 
efficiency of knowledge sharing (Borgatti and Cross, 2003; Cross et al., 2001). 
Granovetter (1973) categorizes the strength of social relationships into three group 
(strong, weak, and absent) based on a combination of the amount of time, the emotional 
intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services. In this research, 
we focus on two types of relationships: direct relationship (strong), and indirect 
relationship (weak), which involve different efficiencies and costs when being used to 
facilitate knowledge transfer. 
Direct ties involve significant interactions between two workers, and are often 
associated with commitments of sharing knowledge (Hansen, 1999). Hence, direct ties 
are effective in terms of transferring knowledge. Indirect ties, on the other hand, allow 
workers to access larger number of colleagues than strong ties, but often suffer low 
quality help (Hansen, 1999; Constant et al., 1996). In order to develop strong ties 
between workers, considerable amount of time and interactions are required, while 
indirect ties could exist between acquaintances who share common contacts (Hansen, 
1999; Constant et al., 1996). While direct ties allow workers to share knowledge more 
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effectively, they can be harmful when knowledge transferred is less complicated, 
because of the time and efforts are required to establish and maintain these social 
connections (Hansen 2002). As a result, having excessive number of direct ties could 
decrease knowledge sharing efficiency. IBM (2006) also recommend firms to carefully 
coordinate knowledge sharing because workers who are engaged in successive sharing 
activities could reduce the productivity and efficiency of the groups that they belong to. 
3.2.4 Modeling knowledge sharing within organizations 
In summary, prior research recognizes that knowledge sharing is desirable and 
can be facilitated though mechanisms such as incentives. However, the problem of what 
characterizes a desirable information flow network is poorly understood. It is important 
for organizations to better understand the characteristics of effective information flow 
networks in order to design such networks. 
This research develops a model to facilitate understanding of what constitutes an 
effective (optimal) information flow network. It integrates and further develops ideas 
from prior research that has modeled knowledge sharing. Cowan and Jonard (2004) use 
simulation to study the impact of different types of network topologies in the context of 
knowledge diffusion across organizations. The social network where knowledge 
diffuses is pre-defined and static. Each agent has a vector of multiple knowledge types 
with varying levels of competences. Knowledge transfer takes place through a myopic 
barter exchange only if there is a direct connection between two workers and trading 
benefits both parties. Their problem is different from the one studied in this research in 
that it did not consider creation of new social relationships to improve knowledge 
sharing, or different types of connections (indirect relationships) between nodes in the 
network. Levine and Prietula (2006) use agent-based simulation to study the impact of 
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different types of ties (strong, weak and performative) between workers in the context 
of knowledge sharing behavior in social networks. Their agents are embedded in local 
groups of direct ties, such as project teams, which again do not change. Each agent has 
a set of skills with varying competence levels. Tasks are randomly assigned to agents 
who may or may not have enough competence to complete. Knowledge, if needed, is 
attained either through self-learning, acquisition through exchange with another agent, 
or both. However, their social networks were static, and did not consider the cost of 
multiple social connections. 
This research studies the problems of maximizing knowledge sharing by 
creating and using social relationships. It examines the impact of worker heterogeneity, 
number of skills, time (cost) of transferring knowledge, on the design of the effective 
organizational information flow networks. 
3.3 Model Development 
3.3.1 Model Preliminary 
We model the problem of designing information flow networks inside a firm for 
effective knowledge management. The firm‟s objective is to maximize the total 
knowledge level of the organization over a planning horizon by creating and using 
direct and indirect organizational social relationships between co-workers. The use of 
information flow networks for effective knowledge management is illustrated in Figure 
24. We consider an organization with a heterogeneous workforce that supports multiple 
skills. Workers vary in terms of competences in these skills and the organizational 
networks that they belong to. Workers also vary in terms of the importance (weight) 
they have for each skill based on the types of tasks performed by each worker. For 
example, in a software consulting firm, functional consultants are required to have a 
73 
 
deeper functional knowledge of the system and the customer processes as compared to 
the technical aspects of the system. On the other hand, technical consultants need to 
focus on the technical aspects of the software system, such as database design and 
system security. Figure 24 illustrates that each worker has a knowledge level and a 
relative weight for each skill. 
Workers within the firm are connected through organizational information flow 
networks. In such an environment, workers competence level is directly associated with 
organizational value, and there is a constant need to acquire knowledge (Hansen 1999). 
Direct relationships occur between workers who can seek knowledge from each other 
directly through organizational or social relationships (Guy et al., 2008; Sahoo et al., 
2008). Examples of such direct relationships include office mates, close friends, team 
members, etc. In Figure 24, in period t, worker A and B, B and C, and E and F, have 
direct relationship with each other. Workers connected by indirect relationships do not 
know each other directly, but have direct relationships with one or more (common) 
workers. Common workers play a bridging role that allows the two workers to get 
acquainted and to share knowledge with each other. In Figure 24, in period t, worker A 
and C have indirect relationship with each other. Note that we treat knowledge transfer 
over direct and indirect relationships as directional. For example, if employee B 
transfers knowledge to employee A, it does not suggest any reverse knowledge flow 
from A to B. The idea of knowledge transfer through organizational relationships is 
consistent with prior research (Sahoo et al., 2008, Davenport et al., 1997).  
Organizations can effectively create direct relationships using strategies such as 
project team, work group, long-term interactions, face-to-face activities (Hansen, 1999; 
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Kotlarsky and Oshri, 2005; Lengnick-Hall and Lengnick-Hall, 2003). Time (effort) is 
required to establish these direct ties. Indirect relationships can be seen as by-products 
of creating such direct ties. We study an organizational problem of assigning workers to 
transfer knowledge using both direct and indirect ties, over the planning horizon. We 
discretize the planning horizon into time periods. It is important to note that the length 
of each period is context-specific and could be one day, one week, one month, etc. 
During any period, a worker may or may not be assigned to participate in the 
knowledge transfer activities. Moreover, workers may provide as well as acquire 
knowledge in the same period. In Figure 24, in period t+1, direct relationships between 
worker pair C and F, and D and E are created to facilitate knowledge transfer. 
 
 
FIGURE 24: Creating and using information flow networks to transfer knowledge 
We model the efficiency of knowledge transfer process as a function of the type 
and strength of the relationship. Direct relationships are more efficient than indirect 
relationships (Levine and Prietula, 2006). Also, we use the age of a relationship as a 
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measure of its strength. Knowledge transfer efficiency is also affected by the status of 
the worker. That is, we consider reduced knowledge acquisition efficiency (overhead) 
for workers who acquire and provide knowledge at the same time.  
3.3.2 Model Formulation 
Mathematical modeling is a useful tool to understand key variables that describe 
a problem and their relationships. The model variables described in Table 7 represent 
the different elements of the problem of designing information flow networks. In 
addition, mathematical modeling helps understand the relationships between different 
variables, and produces a solution that can serve as a benchmark. Understanding the 
relationship between the current state of an organization and the managerial benchmark 
produced by the model facilitates organizational change (Liberatore et al., 2000). This 
approach is appropriate in the context of a knowledge management problem where the 
goal is to design optimal information flow networks that maximize the overall 
knowledge level of the organization. We model the problem of designing information 
flow networks using mixed integer programming (MIP). 
We consider the planning horizon is divided into a set of discrete periods
},..,1{ Tt . The length of each period represents a context specific unit of time after 
which the organization re-assesses the knowledge levels of its workers. Prior research 
on knowledge management suggests that knowledge level of workers can be captured 
and documented effectively using tools such as Microsoft SPUD (Davenport and 
Prusak, 1998), KIN and Tacit Systems EKG (Cross et al., 2001). In each period, the 
organization may create new direct ties or use existing direct and indirect ties, for 
effective knowledge management. 
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TABLE 7: Major model variables and decision variable 
Symbol Definition Type 
t
iklsX _  
= 1 if worker k transfers knowledge in skill s to worker l using tie i 
during period t; = 0 otherwise. },..,2,1{, Klk  . Note that t iklsX _  and 
t
ilksX _  are two different variables. 
Decision Variable 
K  Total number of workers 
Exogenous 
Variables 
T  Planning Horizon 
S  Total number of skills supported by the organization 
ks  
Relative importance (value) of worker k‟s knowledge in skill s to the 
organization, with 1),1,0(
1
 

S
s
ksks   
ik _  
Efficiency of acquiring knowledge using relationship i (i = 0,1 
represent direct, indirect relationship respectively)  
i  
Time coefficient of each worker providing knowledge using 
relationship i (i = 0,1 represent direct, indirect relationship 
respectively) 

 
Time coefficient of creating direct ties 
t
ksW  
Worker k‟s competence level in skill s at the beginning of period t, 
with sMaxsMinsRangesMaxsMin
t
ks WWWWWW  ],,[ .(
1
ksW  are exogenous 
variables, and },...,2{
1 TtWks   are derived variables) 
Derived Variables 
t
klD  
=1 if there is a direct tie between worker k and l in period t (could be 
existing tie, or new tie created during period t), = 0 otherwise. 
t
klV
 
=1 if there is an indirect tie between worker k and l (worker k and l 
share at least one common co-worker connected by direct tie) in 
period t; = 0 otherwise. 
t
klsM  
=1 if worker k‟s knowledge in skill s is better than worker l‟s at the 
beginning of period t; = 0 otherwise. 
t
klsG  
The amount of knowledge can be transferred from worker k to worker 
l in skill s during period t. 
t
iklH _  
The time incurred by worker k in providing knowledge to worker l in 
period t using relationship of type i. Worker k incurs a fixed time   
when creating and using a direct relationship to transfer knowledge for 
the first time. 
t
kZ  
=1 if worker k is busy with transferring knowledge to other workers 
(as a result of assignments in previous periods) in period t, = 0 
otherwise. 
mt
klF
_
 
=1 if till the beginning of period t, worker k has finished transferring 
knowledge to worker l as a result of assignment made in period m, = 0 
otherwise. 
mt
klJ
_
 
=1 if during period t-1, worker k finishes transferring knowledge to 
worker l (as a result of assignment made in period m) and becomes 
available to provide knowledge to other workers in period t, = 0 
otherwise.  
We assume an organization that supports S skills and has K workers. We assume 
a heterogeneous workforce where workers could have varying levels of competence in 
each skill. This skill set (competence values) for a worker is defined as the knowledge 
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vector of a worker. In our model, ],,[ sMaxsMin
t
ks WWW  represents worker k‟s competence 
in skill s at the beginning of period t. Larger (smaller) values indicate an expert (novice) 
worker. Here, )( sMaxsMin WW represents the minimum (maximum) competence level in 
skill s. In addition, as mentioned earlier, we assume that workers vary in term of the 
importance (weight) they have for each skill, based on the types of tasks required of 
them. We use )1 ],1,0[(
1
 

S
s
s
k
s
k  to capture the relative importance of skill s for 
worker k. Therefore, the total competence of worker k, in period t, weighted by the 
importance of different skills is given by, 

S
s
s
k
t
ksW
1
 . During each assignment a worker 
may or may not be assigned to knowledge sharing activities. 
 
The firm‟s objective is to maximize the cumulative weighted competence level 
of all workers, across all skills supported by the organization, over the planning horizon. 
This is given by, 
  
T
t
K
k
S
s
t
ksksWMax
1 1 1
  
Next, we discuss additional details. 
3.3.2.1 Time required to transfer knowledge 
We assume that the total time to taken by worker k to transfer knowledge to 
worker l depends on: (a) knowledge difference between workers k and l, (b) type of tie 
between the workers k and l and, (c) work load of the work providing help.  
The amount of knowledge that worker k can transfer to worker l at the beginning 
of period t is given by, ],0[ sMax
t
kls WG  . If i is the time taken to transfer a unit of 
knowledge over a tie of type i, the time taken by worker k to transfer knowledge to 
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worker l, in skill s, in period t, is given by 

S
s
i
t
ikls
t
kls XG
1
_  . Here 
t
iklsX _ (decision 
variable) is equal to one if worker l is assigned to acquire knowledge from worker k, in 
period t, in skill s, over a tie of type i. It is important to note that knowledge transfer is 
directional, i.e., worker k transferring knowledge to worker l does not imply any 
knowledge flow l to k (
t
ilks
t
ikls XX __  ). Since direct ties are more efficient than indirect 
ties (Levine and Prietula, 2006), we assume 
01   , where 0 and 1 represent direct 
and indirect ties, respectively. 
In each period t, workers can share knowledge using existing direct or indirect 
relationships, or create new direct relationships. },..,1{ TtDtkl  (derived variable) is 
equal to one if there is a direct tie between worker k and l during period t, and zero 
otherwise. Therefore, )1( )1(  tkl
t
kl DD  indicates the absence of pre-existing direct ties 
between workers l and k, in period t. In the absence of pre-existing direct ties between 
workers, organizations need to facilitate direct ties between workers, in order to 
effectively transfer knowledge. Since the creation of new direct ties requires time 
(effort), we introduce a set up coefficient ( ) to capture the time required to facilitate a 
direct relationship between a pair of workers. Note that, the relationships between 
worker k and l are bidirectional i.e., tlk
t
kl DD  . Similarly, },..,1{ TtV
t
kl   (derived 
variable) is equal to one if there is an indirect tie between worker k and l during period 
t, and zero otherwise. Note that workers do not incur a setup cost when using indirect 
ties since these are by-products of creating direct ties. Thus, the knowledge transfer time 
from worker k to worker l using direct ties, in period t, is given by, 
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using indirect relationships is given by, 

S
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t
kls
t
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1
11_  .  
Note that multiple workers may be assigned to the same worker for knowledge 
acquisition, at the same time. However, we assume that the acquisition requests are 
queued and the knowledge transfer process is sequential, based on the order in which 
the requests are made. In our model, t
kZ ( derived variable) is equal to one if in period t, 
worker k is not busy with knowledge provision assignments made in previous periods, 
and zero otherwise. In our model, mt
klF
_  (derived variable) is equal to one if, by period 
t, worker l has finished receiving knowledge from worker k as a result of knowledge 
acquisition assignments made in period m (zero otherwise). 
Therefore, the total time to transfer knowledge is the sum of knowledge transfer 
time and waiting time (time in the queue before knowledge sharing starts). For details 
refer to other knowledge sharing constraints in the model formulation. 
3.3.2.2 Knowledge diffusion using direct ties 
We model the extent of knowledge gained by worker k, as a result of consulting 
co-worker l, as depending on: (a) knowledge difference between worker k and worker l 
at the beginning of the knowledge transfer process ( tklsG ), (b) the knowledge provision 
load of worker l (number of other workers assigned to acquire knowledge from worker 
l), and (c) the strength of the direct relationship between worker k and worker l. 
In this model, workers are allowed to provide and acquire knowledge in the 
same period. However, when a worker is providing and acquiring knowledge at the 
same time, it affects his knowledge acquisition efficiency. We model this overhead as 
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reduced knowledge acquisition efficiency in periods where the worker is simultaneously 
providing and acquiring knowledge i.e., idleilbusyil ____   , where i is equal to zero 
(one) for direct(indirect) ties. It is important to note that, it can take multiple periods for 
worker l to acquire knowledge. Therefore, the average knowledge acquisition  
efficiency for worker l between periods m and q, over a tie of type i, is given by,  
(

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1
_0__0_ )/())1((
q
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r
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r
lbusyl mqZZ  ). 
We assume that the strength of direct ties can vary based on age of the 
relationship between two workers. In our model,

m
u
u
klD
1
 indicates the age of the direct 
relationship between workers k and l, in period m. Thus, 

m
u
u
kl TD
1
/  represents 
efficiency of knowledge transfer between workers k and l, in period m.  
1
lsW  represents the worker‟s initial competence level (at the beginning of the 
planning horizon). Therefore, in period t, worker k‟s updated competence, in skill s, as a 
result of knowledge acquisition from co-workers, using direct and indirect ties, is given by,  
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Finally, the Information Flow Network (IFN) optimization problem can be 
formulated as, 
Objective function: 

  
T
t
K
k
S
s
t
ksksWMax
1 1 1
  
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Knowledge Sharing Relationship Constraints: 
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t
klD =1 if there is a direct tie between worker k and l in period t (could be tie facilitated 
in previous periods, or new tie created during period t), = 0 otherwise. 
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t
klV  = 1 if there is an indirect tie between worker k and l (worker k and l share at least 
one common co-worker connected by direct tie) in period t; = 0 otherwise. 
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Worker l acquires knowledge from k in skill s in period t using indirect tie iff 1) there is 
an existing indirect tie in period t–1, and 2) there is no direct tie between k and l. 
Knowledge Sharing Assignment Constraints: 
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Worker l can acquire knowledge from at most one worker in one skill across S skills in 
period t, iff worker l has finished receiving knowledge from all workers assigned. 
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Worker k can provide knowledge to at most one worker in one skill in period t. 
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Total time spent by worker k providing knowledge and being idle cannot exceed the 
planning horizon T. 
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Other Knowledge Sharing Constraints: 
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t
klsM  = 1 if worker k‟s knowledge in skill s is better than worker l‟s at the beginning of 
period t; = 0 otherwise. 
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t
klsG  is the amount of knowledge can be transferred from worker k to worker l in skill s 
during period t. 
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t
iklH _  is the time incurred by worker k in providing knowledge to worker l in period t 
using relationship of type i. Worker k incurs a fixed time   when creating and using a 
direct relationship to transfer knowledge for the first time. 
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t
kZ  = 1 if worker k is busy with transferring knowledge to other workers (as a result of 
assignments in previous periods) in period t, = 0 otherwise. 
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mt
klF
_  = 1 if till the beginning of period t, worker k has finished transferring knowledge 
to worker l as a result of assignment made in period m, = 0 otherwise. 
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mt
klJ
_  = 1 if during period t-1, worker k finishes transferring knowledge to worker l (as a 
result of assignment made in period m) and becomes available to provide knowledge to 
other workers in period t, = 0 otherwise.  
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t
lsW  is worker l‟s knowledge in skill s at the beginning of period t.          ■ 
3.4 Solution Procedure 
The IFN optimization problem discussed in the previous section is difficult to 
solve as the number of workers increases. Hence, we propose a heuristic that uses 
connection based assignments at discrete points in time in order to solve the problem. 
3.4.1 Connection Based Heuristic (CBH) 
The IFN optimization problem can be solved for each period successively. In 
other words, we first determine the knowledge sharing assignments and the optimal 
knowledge gain in the first period. Next, we set up the problem for the second period. 
To achieve this, we use knowledge transfer information from the first period and take 
into account workers‟ knowledge provision load and workers‟ availability to acquire 
knowledge at the beginning of the second period. In addition, we update their 
knowledge level based on knowledge sharing activities in the first period. The optimal 
worker-to-worker knowledge transfer activities for the second period can be obtained 
by using the above information. Similarly, the knowledge transfer activities for the 
second period then sets up the problem for the third period, and so on. This would 
essentially be a greedy algorithm, wherein the emphasis is to find the optimal 
assignment for each period. 
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Instead, CBH considers the impact of knowledge sharing activities in the 
current period on future periods. First, we consider the potential benefits to other 
workers connected to the worker acquiring knowledge. Particularly, we consider 
the extent of knowledge that can, overtime, diffuse to other workers connected to 
the worker acquiring knowledge. Second, we consider the opportunity cost for the 
worker providing knowledge. That is, we consider the fact that once a worker is 
assigned to provide knowledge he becomes temporarily unavailable to other 
workers.  
Similar to section 3.3, in each period t, firm‟s objective is to maximize the 
cumulative weighted competence level of all workers, across all skills supported by 
the organization. In addition, CBH objective includes, an approximation for the 
potential future benefits of knowledge sharing activities in the current period, and 
the opportunity costs associated with workers providing help. Let tk̂  be the set of 
workers available to acquire knowledge at the beginning of period t. As mentioned 
earlier, the time to transfer knowledge can include a waiting time. In CBH, iklstp _  
represents the period when worker l starts acquiring knowledge from worker k. 
Note that, tp iklst _ . And, iklstq _  be the time period when k finishes transferring 
knowledge to worker l, in skill s, over a tie of type i (either by creating new tie or 
using existing tie).  
The value of assigning worker l to acquire knowledge from worker k, in 
period t, is consists of three terms: (a) the cumulative value of worker l‟s 
knowledge gain, (b) the future value of worker l‟s knowledge gain, and (c) the 
opportunity cost of assigning worker k to acquire knowledge from worker l.  
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Cumulative Value of Worker l’s Knowledge Gain 
Worker l‟s knowledge gain from worker k, using direct tie, can be written 
as, 
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Similarly, the knowledge gain over, indirect tie, can be written as,  
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Future Value of Worker l’s Knowledge Gain 
In order to estimate the future value of knowledge acquisition in period t, 
we need estimate how much of the acquired knowledge in period t can diffuse to 
other workers connected to l in future periods. We measure this by calculating the 
average additional knowledge gain (
future
iklst _ ) for all workers connected to l. Where, 
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Opportunity Cost of Assigning Worker l to Acquire Knowledge from Worker k 
Assigning worker l to acquire knowledge from worker k makes k 
unavailable to provide knowledge to other workers from period iklstp _  to period 
iklstq _ . This delays knowledge provision to any other worker who can potentially 
acquire knowledge from k. We measure the opportunity cost ( oppklst ) by using the 
average knowledge that worker k could transfer to other workers connected to him. 
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Hence, in each period t, the INF optimization problem can be written as, 
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Objective function: 
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Knowledge Sharing Relationship Constraints: 
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Worker l can only acquire help from at most one worker across S skills in period t. 
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Worker k can only provide knowledge to at most one worker across S skills in period t. 
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Knowledge transfer cannot exceed the planning horizon T. 
Using Hungarian Method to solve the problem for each period t 
Next, we show how to solve the problem for each period t using Hungarian 
methods. We calculate the profit matrix of all possible worker-to-worker knowledge 
transfer activities, where each element iskla ,,,  represents the expected value of assigning 
worker l to acquire knowledge from worker k in skill s using tie i. As discussed above, 
there expected value of assigning worker l to acquire knowledge from worker k can be 
calculated as )()()( ______,,, iklstiklst
opp
klstiklst
future
iklstiklst
gain
iklstiskl pqqTqTa   (Block A in Figure 
25). In addition, we allow workers to not acquire knowledge in period t (Block B in 
Figure 25), where the profit equals zero ( 01, Kla ). 
We then test the feasibility of each knowledge transfer activity. First, worker l 
cannot transfer knowledge to himself. Thus, the profit of assigning worker l to  
acquire knowledge from l is set to  to prevent this assignment  
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( }1,0{},,..,2,1{,ˆ  ,,,  iSskla tisll ). Second, each knowledge transfer activity 
cannot exceed the planning horizon T. Hence, we check the value of 
iklstqT _  for each 
possible worker-to-worker assignment ( iskla ,,, ). If 0_  iklstqT , we set the value of 
iskla ,,,  to   such that it will not be selected.  
 
FIGURE 25: Profit Matrix for the Hungarian Method used in CBH 
Finally, Figure 26 summarizes the Connection Based Heuristic. 
 
FIGURE 26: Connection Based Heuristic (CBH) 
3.4.2 Performance of Connection Based Heuristic (CBH)  
To evaluate the performance of our heuristic, we solve the MIP formulation 
using CPLEX for small problem instances and compare it against the solution using 
CBH. This methodology is consistent with prior research (Dawande et al., 2008; Kumar 
et al., 2007). In terms of compute time, the CBH solution is obtained in a few seconds 
compared to 10 hours for CPLEX. We observe that maximum gap between the CPLEX 
solution and the CBH solution (CBH Gap) is about 7% for the problems solved using 
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CPLEX (Table 8). The performance of our CBH is comparable with existing 
researching adopting this methodology (Dawande et al., 2008; Kumar et al., 2007). 
TABLE 8: Percentage Gap of CBH results from CPLEX solution 
Problem 
Class 
Worker 
Heterog
eneity
 
Number 
of 
Workers 
MIP Problem Size:  
Rows × Columns 
(Non-zeros) 
CPLEX 
Gap (%) 
CBH 
Gap 
(%) 
CPU time 
for CBH 
(sec) 
1 
Low 
10 26,530×19,785(104,175) 6.59 3.71 0.71 
2 12 49,407×32,745(189,895) 7.42 3.92 0.81 
3 14 87,323×56,175(391,635) 7.98 5.13 0.72 
4 16 159,275×98,565(771,115) 8.14 7.12 1.01 
5 
Med 
10 26,530×19,785(104,175) 5.71 3.70 0.78 
6 12 49,407×32,745(189,895) 7.51 3.60 0.68 
7 14 87,323×56,175(391,635) 7.56 4.92 0.97 
8 16 159,275×98,565(771,115) 7.73 7.09 0.77 
9 
High 
10 26,530×19,785(104,175) 5.91 3.17 0.89 
10 12 49,407×32,745(189,895) 7.71 3.59 0.78 
11 14 87,323×56,175(391,635) 8.16 4.87 0.97 
12 16 159,275×98,565(771,115) 8.13 6.96 0.86 
* 
Number of Skills = 2, Time to create direct tie = 2, Planning horizon = 10, 2/1:/ 10  ,  
** 
Low Worker Heterogeneity ~N(2.5, 0.8), Medium Worker Heterogeneity ~N(2.5, 1), High Worker 
Heterogeneity ~N(2.5, 1.2). 
3.5 Experiment Design 
The complexity of the problem precludes analytical solution and requires us to 
use simulation. Simulation with synthetic data allows us to obtain insights into 
relationships between key variables impacting the design of the information flow 
networks. This approach is appropriate when the underlying phenomenon is complex 
and real world data is difficult to obtain, and is used in studying knowledge 
management (Buco et al., 2003). 
This section describes the design of simulation experiments including, key 
parameters and their estimation. Fifty replications of each sample path were used, and 
average values of system performance measures were calculated. Same as in section 
2.4.1, simulations were extremely computation-intensive. Experiments were run on a 
cluster of 160 Intel Xeon CPUs on Dell blade servers with Red Hat Enterprise Linux 
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operating system. The average time for running each replication of a sample path was 1 
hour. 
TABLE 9: Experiment parameter values 
Type Parameter Values Justification 
System 
Environment 
K  100  
S  2/3/4/5  In Cowan and Jonard (2005) “Each agent has a 
5-category knowledge vector” and Prabhakar et 
al. (2005) refers to: “Programming Skills, 
Operating System Skills, Database, ERP, and e-
Commerce Server Skills.” 
 100  
Worker 
Related 
s
k  
Each worker is 
randomly specialized 
in one skill 
In Backes-Gellner and Mure (2008) “in 
industries, such as precision mechanics, 
insurances, etc., skills requirements are less 
homogenous, so the variance in the skill weights 
distribution is assumed to be larger.” Our 
parameter values are consistent with Backes-
Gellner and Mure (2008).
 
1
ksW  
Follows Normal 
Distribution:  
N(2.5, 0.8) /N(2.5, 1.0) 
/N(2.5, 1.2)  
Lester (2005) proposed five categories to assess 
employee‟s skill level. A normal distribution of 
worker competence is consistent with prior 
research (Sayın and Karabatı, 2007). 
Knowledge 
Transfer 
i  
0.15~0.4 We experiment with a range of values in order to 
study the sensitivity of our results. 
i  :0 6/10/14/18, 
:1 10/15/20/25 
In Hansen (2002), “relying on established direct 
relations may ease the difficulties of transferring 
noncodified knowledge, …, reducing the time it 
takes to explain the knowledge and understand 
one another”. 
 
5/10/15/20 We experiment with a range of values in order to 
study the sensitivity of our results. 
Table 9 describes the numerical values, and justification for parameters used in 
our simulation experiments. Where possible, we have attempted to base these values on 
ranges that could be encountered in practice and/or prior research. Since parameters 
related with knowledge sharing in our model are difficult to obtain, we experiment with 
multiple values to sensitize the organization to information flow network design issues 
that involve these parameters. 
We consider a population of 100 workers, with an average of two direct ties per 
worker. Each worker has multiple skills. Workers‟ knowledge level in each skill at the 
T

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beginning of the planning horizon (
1
ksW ) is initialized by selecting from a normal 
distribution. After that, workers are categorized into three groups – expert, average, and 
novice – based on their average initial knowledge level across skills. Based on prior 
research, workers with an average knowledge level (

S
s
ks SW
1
1 / ) between 0 and 2 are 
defined as Novices, between 2 and 3 as average worker, and between 3 and 5 as experts 
(Lester, 2005). Note that the each worker‟s total weight of all skills remains 100% 
regardless of the number of skills supported by the organization ( %100
1


S
s
s
k ). On 
the other hand, each worker is set to be specialized in a random skill ŝ , by increasing 
the value of sk
ˆ  such that ssSssk
s
k
ˆ},,..,1{   3
ˆ
  . At the beginning of the 
planning horizon, each worker randomly decides whether to transfer knowledge or not, 
representing the organization‟s initial status. If he decides to transfer knowledge, he 
randomly selects one of his colleagues (through direct or indirect tie) and picks a 
randomly skill. In summary, each worker randomly shares knowledge at the beginning 
of the planning horizon, which represents the current state of no management of 
information flow networks. Organizations then systematically decide which direct ties 
to create, and which ties to use, in order to effective share knowledge through 
information flow networks over the planning horizon. 
Our objective was to better understand the process by which knowledge is 
shared, and as well as the structure of information flow networks, for different types of 
worker populations. Also we varied worker expertise distribution, time coefficient of 
providing knowledge over direct and indirect ties, and number of skills supported by the 
organization. 
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3.6 Results and Discussion 
We present selected results from our experiments to illustrate the properties of 
effective information flow networks in terms of measures of knowledge gain, and 
sharing behavior between and within different groups
7
. We present the following sets of 
results: (a) the structure of effective information flow networks (as described by the 
number and types of ties between and within a different types of worker groups), (b) the 
impact of worker heterogeneity on knowledge gain and sharing, (c) the impact of time 
(cost) of creating and using knowledge sharing relationships, and (d) the impacts of 
number of skills supported by the organization on knowledge gain and sharing. 
3.6.1 The Structure of Effective Information Flow Networks 
As discussed earlier, we have three different groups of workers (experts, average 
and novice workers) in the organization. We seek to understand the similarities and 
differences between these groups of workers in terms of knowledge sharing behavior. 
Specifically, we are interested in similarities and differences between these groups in 
terms of the use of direct and indirect ties to facilitate knowledge transfer. We expect 
firms to facilitate novice workers to create ties with expert and average workers in order 
to improve knowledge sharing. However, the relative importance and roles of different 
types of workers is not always clear. Our results indicate that it is not optimal for a firm 
to just facilitate knowledge sharing between expert workers and novice workers. 
Average workers have a crucial intermediary role to play in facilitating knowledge 
flow. Table 10 indicates that the highest number of direct/indirect ties occur between 
 
 
                                                 
7
 Base parameter value used in the experiment: K=100, S= 5, T=100, ;100  ;201  ;10  
busyidlebusyidle _1_1_0_0 ///   = 0.4/0.3/0.2/0.1; 
s
ksW ~N(2.5,1) 
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experts and average workers, followed by the ties between average workers and 
novices, and then between experts and novices. Table 10 suggests that the number of 
direct and indirect ties within the average worker groups is higher than the number of 
ties within the novice and expert groups. In addition, we note that indirect ties between 
experts and novices have a crucial role to play in facilitating knowledge sharing, since 
they are much larger in number than direct ties between experts and novices (Table 10). 
Effective knowledge transfer tends to take place in short bursts (knowledge 
transfers of short duration) between workers who do not have very high knowledge 
differences. Such knowledge transfer allows the worker providing knowledge and the 
worker gaining knowledge, to become available relatively quickly for additional 
knowledge provision and /or knowledge acquisition. In addition, such a knowledge 
transfer pattern allows direct ties created between workers to become available to other 
workers for indirect tie formation, relatively quickly. The following sections explain the 
underlying dynamics of the knowledge diffusion process in greater detail. 
This result has important managerial implications. Organizations need to 
recognize the valuable bridging role that average workers can play in facilitating 
knowledge transfer. Our results indicate that ties between average and expert workers 
can have large network effects and facilitate effective knowledge transfer. This result is 
contrary to the common practice of facilitating knowledge transfer between experts and 
novices. 
3.6.2 The Impact of Knowledge Transfer Efficiency and Worker Heterogeneity on 
Creation and Use of Ties 
This section facilitates a deeper understanding of the dynamics of knowledge 
sharing and diffusion by studying the impact of knowledge transfer efficiency and 
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worker heterogeneity on tie creation and use. The term knowledge sharing refers to 
knowledge exchange between pairs of workers. Knowledge diffusion, on the other 
hand, refers to the change in the cumulative knowledge level of the workforce over 
time. 
We observe (Figure 27) that high knowledge acquisition efficiency result in 
better knowledge diffusion, (as measured by total cumulative weighted knowledge gain 
over the planning horizon), as expected. Interestingly, we also notice that knowledge 
diffusion over the planning horizon decreases as the worker heterogeneity increases. 
This merits additional explanation. 
  
FIGURE 27: Cumulative weighted knowledge gain 
percentage decrease for different values of worker 
heterogeneity
8
 
FIGURE 28: Number of times direct ties are 
accessed for different values of worker 
heterogeneity 
  
FIGURE 29: Number of direct ties created for 
different values of worker heterogeneity 
FIGURE 30: Number of effective direct ties per 
worker for different values of worker 
heterogeneity 
                                                 
8
 Low worker heterogeneity – N(2.5, 0.8); Medium worker heterogeneity – N(2.5, 1.0); High worker 
heterogeneity – N(2.5, 1.2); Low efficiency – 0.4/0.3/0.2/0.1; Medium efficiency – 0.6/0.45/0.3/0.15; 
High Efficiency – 0.8/0.6/0.4/0.2. 
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FIGURE 31: Effective indirect ties used per worker 
for different values of worker heterogeneity 
FIGURE 32: Number of ties use over time for low 
worker heterogeneity 
Recall that, in our model, workers have three methods of acquiring knowledge: 
using an existing direct tie, creating a direct tie, and using an indirect tie. The amount of 
knowledge acquired is a function of type of tie (direct or indirect ties), knowledge 
difference between two workers, and efficiency of knowledge sharing. Worker‟s 
competence is updated after knowledge acquisition is complete, which may last for 
multiple time periods. Using existing direct ties to acquire knowledge is the most 
efficient method as discussed above. However, existing direct ties may not provide 
access to competent workers. Thus, relatively abundant but inefficient indirect ties may 
to be used. Alternatively, additional direct ties could be created to access competent 
workers while incurring the setup cost. It is important to note that irrespective of the 
type of ties used/created, workers who are engaged in providing knowledge during a 
time period, are less efficient in acquiring knowledge. Knowledge transfer occurs in 
short bursts in environments characterized by low worker knowledge heterogeneity as 
discussed in Section 3.3.2.1. Thus, in low worker heterogeneity environment, larger 
pool of workers is available for consultation as compared to workers in high worker 
heterogeneity environment. Over time, this results in greater knowledge diffusion 
(Figure 27).  
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When worker knowledge heterogeneity is high, on average, each knowledge 
transfer results in larger amount of knowledge acquired, but also takes longer, as 
compared to a scenario where worker heterogeneity is low. This explains why the total 
number of times that direct and indirect (not shown) ties used decreases as worker 
knowledge heterogeneity increases (Figure 28). 
Interestingly, we observe that the number of direct ties created over the planning 
horizon increases as worker heterogeneity increases (Figure 29). This can be attributed 
to longer knowledge transfer times associated with increased worker heterogeneity, as 
discussed above. Longer knowledge transfer times reduce the opportunity to make a 
competent worker available to multiple workers over the planning horizon. Hence, new 
direct ties, providing access to available competent workers, need to be created in order 
to facilitate knowledge diffusion. We also observe that number of direct ties created 
decreases as knowledge acquisition efficiency increases (Figure 29). Note that high 
efficiency allows workers to acquire knowledge faster, which increases the pool of 
available competent workers for consultation and provides opportunities for reuse of 
existing ties over time. Thus, reducing the number of direct ties created over the 
planning horizon. 
It is important to note that there are more direct ties within groups than between 
groups, while more indirect ties are used between groups than within groups (Figures 30 
and 31). This is because knowledge difference within a group is lower compared to 
knowledge difference between groups. As discussed earlier, small knowledge difference 
allows worker quickly share knowledge with each other, resulting in faster knowledge 
diffusion. Direct ties are the preferred method of knowledge transfer because of better 
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efficiency and less time to transfer knowledge. Hence, more direct ties are used within 
group than between groups (Figure 30). 
Next we focus on the pattern in which different types of ties are used, over the 
planning horizon. In the beginning of the planning horizon, there are relatively fewer 
direct ties and it takes time to establish new direct ties. This limits access to competent 
workers via direct ties in the beginning of the planning horizon. On the other hand, 
indirect ties are relatively abundant and provide better access to competent workers, 
although they are less efficient than direct ties. This explains why in the beginning of 
the planning horizon, indirect tie usage is slightly larger than direct tie usage (Figure 
32). Over time, direct ties are systematically created to transfer knowledge and facilitate 
knowledge diffusion. Note that, the strength of existing and newly created direct ties 
increases with time, increasing the difference in knowledge sharing efficiency between 
direct and indirect ties. In addition, knowledge diffusion results in improved access to 
competent workers via direct ties. Hence, we observe in Figure 32 that the use of direct 
ties significantly exceeds the use of indirect ties over time (time period greater than 60). 
3.6.3 Impacts of Various Time (Cost) Coefficients 
In order to examine the robustness of the model trend seen thus far, we study the 
impact of various time coefficients on the number of direct ties created during the 
planning horizon. Three types of time coefficients are examined: time to create direct 
ties, time to transfer knowledge using direct ties, and time to transfer knowledge using 
indirect ties. Note that, in these experiments the time to transfer one unit of knowledge 
using direct ties is always smaller than the time required using indirect ties. It is not 
surprising that as the time to create direct tie increases, the cumulative weighted 
knowledge gain decreases (Figure 35). Similar trends are observed when time to 
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transfer using direct/indirect ties increases (Not shown). Note that creating new direct 
ties to transfer knowledge is less attractive as time to create direct tie increases. Thus, 
the number of direct ties created decreases as the time to create direct tie increases 
(Figure 33).  
Interestingly, as the time to transfer knowledge using direct ties increases, we 
observe that more direct ties are created regardless of the heterogeneity of the workforce 
(Figure 34). As time to transfer knowledge using direct/indirect ties increases, the time 
that workers are engaged in each knowledge transfer is longer, making them 
unavailable to other workers for consultation. Thus increasing the need to create new 
direct ties to acquire knowledge. 
  
FIGURE 33: Number of direct ties created for 
different values of time to create direct ties 
FIGURE 34: Number of direct ties created for 
different values of time to transfer knowledge 
using direct ties 
 
 
FIGURE 35: Cumulative weighted knowledge gain 
percentage decrease for different values of time to 
create direct ties 
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3.6.4 Impacts of Number of Skills Supported by The Organization 
The number of skills supported by an organization has interesting impacts on 
knowledge diffusion dynamics. Note that for each worker, the total weight of all skills 
sums up to one regardless of the number of skills supported by the organization. Hence, 
as the number of skills increases, the weight for each skill reduces. Each worker may 
need to improve knowledge in multiple skills depending on the weight of each skill and 
the existing knowledge level in a skill. Recall that the objective of an organization is to 
maximize the total weighted knowledge of all workers over a fixed planning horizon. 
As a result, the amount of time each worker spends on acquiring knowledge in each 
skill decreases, reducing the cumulative weighted knowledge gain (Figure 36). 
  
FIGURE 36: Cumulative weighted knowledge gain 
percentage decrease for different values of number 
of skills 
FIGURE 37: Number of direct ties created for 
different values of number of skills 
  
FIGURE 38: Number of times direct ties are 
accessed for different values of number of skills 
FIGURE 39: Number of times indirect ties are 
accessed for different values of number of skills 
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We observe that in Figure 37, the total number of direct ties created decreases as 
the number of skills increases. As discussed earlier, whether to use existing ties or 
create new ties to transfer knowledge depends on the availability of the knowledge 
provider and the amount of knowledge that can be transferred. As the number of skills 
increases, the likelihood of acquiring knowledge using existing direct/indirect ties also 
increases since many workers need to acquire knowledge in multiple skills. There is less 
need to create direct ties to acquire knowledge, and can re-use existing ties to transfer 
knowledge for multiple skills. Hence, as the number of skills supported by the 
organization increases, the total number of times direct ties are used increases (Figure 
38).  
Organizations that support multiple skills allow workers to re-use both direct 
and indirect ties to transfer knowledge. However, number of times that indirect ties are 
used does not always increase as the number of skills increases. Recall that existing 
direct ties are the preferred method of acquiring knowledge, but are limited in numbers. 
On the other hand, indirect ties are less efficient, but have access to wider range of 
workers. As the number of skills supported by an organization increases from 2 to 3, 
existing direct and indirect ties used increase as a result of tie re-use (Figure 39). But as 
the number of skills supported increases from 3 to 5, re-using existing direct ties 
become dominant that there is less need to use indirect ties to transfer knowledge. Thus, 
reducing the number of times indirect ties are used (Figure 39). 
3.7 Limitations and Future Research 
In this research, we assume that workers stay with the company across the 
planning horizon. As the model in this research was designed to study knowledge 
acquisition and provision over the planning horizon for a limited planning horizon, this 
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is not a limiting assumption. However, it is possible that employees change their jobs 
and leave the company. Additionally, the company could hire workers to fill job 
openings. Workers leaving and joining the company (labor turnover) could affect the 
performance of the IFNs. Labor turnover may be harmful to the company if skilled 
workers are often leaving, taking away their social ties inside the firm at the same time. 
While companies could hire employees to fill the vacancy, time is required for new 
hires to establish social ties to share knowledge inside the company. Future research 
could study the impact of labor turnover on the design and performance of IFNs. In this 
research, knowledge depreciation is assumed to be negligible. Additional research 
opportunities involve the design of IFNs under high knowledge depreciation scenarios. 
This research assumes that the knowledge sharing activities are organized in a fashion 
such that knowledge transferred from only one worker to another worker at a time. One 
may argue that knowledge transfer could involve more than two workers at a time. For 
example, knowledge can be transferred through seminars provided by co-workers to 
share their expertise with other team members, group discussions between multiple 
members in the same office, and other group related techniques. Future research could 
study IFNs that allow knowledge to be transferred among a group of employees. This 
extension would involve further exploration about group knowledge sharing dynamics, 
and is likely to be more complex. In this research, we focus on the design of using 
direct and indirect ties to facilitate knowledge sharing. Future research could examine 
different types of direct/indirect ties (team members, office mates, and reporting 
relationships) and associated efficiency and costs to further help organizations establish 
the IFNs to transfer knowledge. 
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3.8 Conclusions 
“Knowledge intensive service providers are highly dependent on human workers 
who possess specialized knowledge and skills.” (Leung and Glissmann, 2010) Such 
companies are increasingly interested in “the optimal design” that meets the 
organizational needs such as employee skill development (Leung and Glissmann, 2010). 
The MIP presented in this research aims to understand the design of effective IFNs to 
maximize knowledge sharing. The value of the model lies in understanding important 
factors to consider when designing and using IFNs. The model and solution procedure 
proposed in this chapter can be used either as a starting point for organizational design 
or as a means of benchmarking existing organizations. 
Our results underscore the important bridging role that average workers can play 
in facilitating knowledge transfer. We observe that most knowledge sharing happens 
between average workers and experts, followed by knowledge sharing between average 
workers and novices. Our results also provide insights into the use of the effective IFNs. 
We find that organizations seem to benefit from knowledge transfer between workers 
who do not have very high knowledge differences. Such knowledge transfer allows 
workers who are sharing knowledge to become available relatively quickly for 
additional knowledge provision and/or knowledge acquisition. This finding is contrary 
to the common practice of transferring large amount of knowledge between experts and 
novices. 
Both direct ties and indirect ties are valuable to the company and may 
complement each other. Direct ties are used more within groups than between groups, 
while more indirect ties are used between groups than within groups. In organizations 
where large number of skills are supported, there is less need to create additional direct 
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ties to transfer knowledge since workers can re-use their existing ties. However, 
organizations benefit less from knowledge sharing during the same planning horizon 
when the number of skills supported by the company increases. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4: CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 
Organizations increasingly use knowledge-intensive IT and IT-enabled services 
delivered from multiple locations. Employees in such organizations may interact with 
each other in order to deliver high quality service and constitute knowledge-intensive 
service delivery networks (KISDN). KISDN are not limited to IT service, and include 
other knowledge-intensive services that are facilitated by sophisticated IT such as some 
types of management, financial services and engineering consulting services. The 
dissertation aims to understand the management and design of such KISDN - an 
important, yet under-researched area with significant potential for IS as well as 
interdisciplinary research. 
The dissertation first presents a mixed integer programming model which 
integrates perspectives from multiple traditional disciplines such as information science, 
management science, social sciences and IS. Specifically, KISDN in this dissertation 
represent service systems with a significant emphasis on knowledge management in a 
distributed resource environment. The proposed model considers worker competence, 
organizational information networks, worker availability and task characteristics. We 
propose the use of IT to perform integrated business analytics which combines the 
above mentioned factors in support of the service workflow process. The results suggest 
the significant additional value that can be generated by facilitating knowledge sharing 
using organizational IFNs, in conjunction with information regarding worker 
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competence, worker availability, and service tasks. Additionally, a network topology 
where communication between random workers in the organization is encouraged 
(random networks) is preferred over other network structures in terms of KISDN 
performance. We also discuss ways to reduce the performance difference between 
network topologies by intentionally increasing network density, and strategically using 
worker training when altering the network structure might be difficult.  
Another mixed integer programming model was proposed to further study the 
design of the IFNs in different organizational environments. Given the fact that 
employees could be much more likely to turn to their peers and colleagues for 
knowledge rather than access electronic knowledge bases that firms build, organizations 
are increasingly interesting in facilitating knowledge sharing among employees through 
IFNs. To the best of our knowledge, there is limited research on the design of such 
IFNs. The model proposed in chapter 3 aims at maximizing knowledge sharing by 
creating and using social relationships under different organizational factors such as the 
heterogeneity of the workforce, efficiency and costs associated with knowledge sharing, 
and number of skills. The results suggest that a more heterogeneous workforce benefits 
less from knowledge sharing using IFNs, requires more direct relationships to be 
created than a less heterogeneous workforce. Our results indicate that the process of 
knowledge sharing does not necessarily occur just between the expert workers and 
novice workers. Average workers play a crucial intermediary role in facilitating 
knowledge flow. As the number of skills supported by the organizations increases, less 
direct relationships are facilitated as a result of re-using the same tie for multiple skills. 
However, organizations benefit less from knowledge sharing since each worker spends 
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less time on each skill. Our results indicate that the cost of creating new direct ties is 
crucial in improving knowledge sharing benefits. Organizations should explore 
technology-facilitated means of creating new direct ties. 
In summary, this dissertation contributes to the emerging field of service 
science, by advancing our understanding of service systems in knowledge-intensive 
distributed resource environments. The first model proposed can serve as a managerial 
benchmarking framework for KISDN management, which allows organizations to 
examine dynamics between different factors impacting KISDN performance. The 
second model enables organizations to understand the design and the use of IFNs to 
maximize knowledge sharing. This, in turn, facilitates systematic design of KISDN. 
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APPENDIX A: LINEARIZED VERSION OF KISDE OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM 
 
 
Here we provide the linearized version of the KISDN optimization problem 
discussed in Section 2.3. We use this for solving our problem instances in CPLEX.  
Objective Function: 
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i
klstG  represents worker k‟s gain in skill s from worker l using tie i in time period t. 
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kstG  is the maximum gain worker k can get in skill s through all ties, where ).4,0(kstG  
},..,1{},,..,1{},,..,1{              TtSsKkGWC kstkstkst   
kstC  is worker k‟s effective competence after searching for help, in period t and skill s. 
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Worker k‟s updated competence in period t. 
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APPENDIX B: MODEL EXTENSION DETAILS 
 
 
B-1 Formulation for KISDE Optimization Problem with Training 
Here we present the model for the KISDN optimization problem with training. 
We only provide new and modified constraints which are different from the Model 
discussed in section 2.3. Other constraints can be found in section 2.3.  
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Worker k can be assigned in the current period iff worker k is not busy with any 
tasks/training.  
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Total time spent by a worker on tasks, training, and on the bench cannot exceed T. 
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ktZ = 0 if worker k is available in period t (i.e., not busy), 1 otherwise. 
Knowledge Acquisition Constraints: 
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B-2 Heuristics for Solving KISDE Optimization Problem with Training 
Similar to Appendix A.2.2, the value of training depends on (a) number of 
additional tasks of type m completed as a result of training in skill s )( 43 kmstkmst   , (b) 
the revenue from each of these tasks )(
1
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
S
r
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m
rq  , and (c) the cost of sending workers to 
training. Similar to 1kmjt  and 
2
kmjt  used to calculate the value of learning, 
3
kmst  and 
4
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are given as follows, 
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Recall from Section 2.8.1 that by sending workers to training the organization 
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can incur costs in terms of additional wait time penalties. This cost of keeping tasks 
waiting has two components: (a) keeping existing tasks waiting, 
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/)(ˆ   where mtn̂ is the number of available type m tasks at time 
period t, and (b) keeping new tasks waiting (that arrive during st ), 
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Hence, the payoff from assigning workers to training depends on, (a) the number 
of additional tasks completed as a result of taking training in skill s )( 43 kmstkmst   , (b) the 
revenue from each of these tasks )(
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Let tn̂  be the set of un-assigned tasks and tk̂  be the set of available workers at 
the beginning of period t. Using the same notation as in Section 2.3 (Table 1), in period 
t , the firm‟s maximization problem using DAH, can be we written as follows, 
Objective Function 
  
    
  
  
     
     

















t tt t
t
t t
kk
bk
nj
kjt
S
s
kst
nj
a
S
s
sjs
kk
kjt
kk
S
s
M
m
stst
S
r
r
m
rma
M
m
st
S
r
r
m
rmtakmstkmst
M
m
S
r
rr
m
rkst
kk nj
M
m
kmjtkmjt
S
s
ss
m
s
S
s kl i
i
klstl
i
jskstjsjskjkjt
hXYX
KqKqnqY
qhChRX
ˆ ˆ1ˆ 1ˆ
ˆ 1 1 11 1
43
1 1
ˆ ˆ 1
21
11 ˆ
2
0
)1()1(
)2/)1()((/)(ˆ))((
)()(



 
Subject to, 
 , ˆ   1
1ˆ
t
S
s
kst
nj
kjt kkYX
t


and ,  ˆ                1
ˆ
t
kk
kjt njX
t


 
}1,0{kjtX  
and }1,0{kstY   },..,1{,
ˆ,ˆ Sskknj tt             ■ 
119 
 
APPENDIX C: NETLOGO INTERFACE 
 
 
 
